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THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND INSURANCE:
AN UPDATE AND THE QUESTION OF
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
John F. Stanton*
"It is the policy of the United States to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United
States. '
I.

INTRODUCTION

Little imagination is needed to understand the paramount
importance of eliminating unfair discrimination in housing. To combat
such discrimination, Congress passed the Fair Housing Act ("FHA")2
over thirty years ago. Although the FHA has been in effect since 1968,
unfair discrimination in the insurance industry persists and has been
well-documented.3 Almost from the start, the application of the FHA to
insurance underwriting practices has sparked a contentious debate

* B.A. Dartmouth College, 1993; J.D., cum laude, Georgetown University Law Center,
1997. Law clerk to the Honorable Nathaniel R. Jones, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
1998-99. The author is a senior associate at the Washington, D.C. law offices of Howrey Simon
Arnold & White, LLP, and represented the plaintiffs in the Wai and Koontz cases discussed in this
Article. This Article would not have been possible without the commitment to pro bono cases of
Howrey Simon Arnold & White, LLP. The author is also grateful for the helpful suggestions and
contributions to this Article of Lara H. Schwartz, Gary S. Thompson, Robert G. Schwemm, Stephen
M. Dane, Sarah E. Swisher, and Ellen S. Winter.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).
2. Seeid.§§ 3601-3631.
3. See, e.g.,
C. Heimer, The Racial and Organizational Origins of Insurance Redlining, 10 J.
INTERGROUP REL. 42, 53 (1982); William E. Murray, Note, Homeowners Insurance Redlining: The
Inadequacy of Federal Remedies and the Future of the Property Insurance War, 4 CONN. INS. L.J.
735, 737 (1998); Gregory D. Squires, Why An Insurance Regulation toProhibit Redlining?, 31 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 489, 496-98 (1998) (discussing numerous studies); Douglas Wissoker et al.,
Urban Institute, Testing for Discrimination in Home Insurance, available at
http://www.urban.org/housing/hud-es.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2001). See also generally NAIC,
Redlining: Discrimination in Insurance, http://www.naic.org/llibrary/reference/subjects/redlining.ht
m (2001-02) (collecting articles regarding insurance discrimination).
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between fair housing advocates and defenders of the insurance industry
that remains as strong as ever today.4
The debate will certainly continue for the foreseeable future.
However, several recent judicial decisions have provided some muchneeded guidance to both plaintiffs and insurers as to what the FHA does
and does not require of insurance companies. These decisions have
answered several of the questions long debated by fair housing
advocates and insurers-whether the FHA applies to insurance at all,
whether state regulations governing insurance take precedence over the
FHA, and whether a disparate impact theory is cognizable under the
FHA against insurers. In addition, these decisions have expounded on a
previously unexplored topic-the relevance of disability discrimination
in insurance in the provision of homeowners' insurance.
As fair housing advocates become more encouraged by the results
of these recent decisions (as well as past successes in fair
housing/insurance lawsuits), one may expect additional litigation in the
fair housing/insurance context. Indeed, many of the lawsuits that have
challenged insurance practices under fair housing laws have, in fact,
challenged insurance practices that have been in effect for decades, and
which are undoubtedly still being used by many insurers.
The sociological benefits of ensuring fairness in insurance have
been thoroughly discussed by other commentators,5 and will not be
repeated here. Rather, this article attempts to delineate exactly what is
required to demonstrate a violation of the FHA for both race and

4. See, e.g., ANDREW L. SANDLER ET AL., CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES §§ 2.01-02
(2002); Robert R. Detlefsen, When the Discrimination Police Come Calling, Insurers Need to Be
Ready, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., June 2000, at 36; Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, 'Redlining,'
and the Discriminatory Access to Loans, Credit, and Insurance: An Historical and Empirical
Analysis of Consumers Who Sued Lenders and Insurers in Federal and State Courts, 1950-1995, 33
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 583, 671-74 (1996); Christopher P. McCormack, Note, Business Necessity in
Title VIII: Importing An Employment Discrimination Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act, 54
FORDHAM L. REV. 563, 598-601 (1986); Jane McGrew et al., Fair Housing: An Agenda for the
Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, 27 How. L.J. 1291, 1304-09 (1984); Kevin J.
Byrne, Comment, Application of Title VIII to Insurance Redlining, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 472, 473-84
(1980); Ruthanne DeWolfe et al., Civil Rights Implications of Insurance Redlining, 29 DEPAUL L.
REV. 315, 336-39 (1980); David I. Badain, Insurance Redlining and the Future of the Urban Core,
16 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 34-46 (1980); Marianne M. Jennings, Redlining-Now Insurers
Are Guilty of It, Too, 8 REAL EST. L.J. 323, 329-30 (1980); Robert Yaspan, Note, Property
Insurance and the American Ghetto: A Study in Social Irresponsibility, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 218,
268-69 (1971). See also generally Squires, supra note 3; Murray, supra note 3; John Hugh Gilmore,
Note, Insurance Redlining & The Fair Housing Act: The Lost Opportunity of Mackey v. Nationwide
Insurance Companies, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 563 (1985); Leo J. Jordan, Property Insurance and Fair
Housing, 18 FORUM 223 (1982).
5. See generally articles cited supra note 4.
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disability discrimination in the insurance context. Part II of this Article
discusses some background to insurance and identifies the substantive
provisions of the FHA as applicable to insurance. Part III of this article
recounts the development of the FHA, and traces the administrative and
judicial decisions that have interpreted the FHA's relationship to
insurance as applicable to insurance practices. Part IV discusses some of
the more frequent (albeit entirely unsuccessful) threshold defenses made
by insurers when faced with an FHA lawsuit. Part V discusses all three
possible theories for setting forth an FHA claim in the insurance context,
and explains how an FHA plaintiff can meet his or her burden when
challenging unfair discrimination against an, insurer, and also how
insurers can defend against the plaintiffs' claims.
II.

BACKGROUND TO THE

A.

FHA AND INSURANCE

Unfair Discriminationin Insurance

Broadly speaking, insurance underwriting has been defined as "the
process by which companies determine whether to accept or to reject an
application for insurance coverage."6 The FHA seeks to eliminate unfair
discrimination such as illegal redlining, the practice of either declining
to write insurance or charging higher rates for people who live in
particular areas, especially those with large or growing minority
populations.7 The term originates from insurers' and mortgage lenders'
historical practice of drawing "red lines" on maps and dividing covered
areas (which invariably were "white" neighborhoods) from other areas
where coverage would not be available (which invariably were minority
neighborhoods).' Redlining has since evolved to encompass the refusal
to underwrite a dwelling for reasons other than the quality of the
dwelling or the qualifications of the individual applicant.9. Indeed,
"unfair discrimination" within the context of the FHA can be understood
today to mean any differentials in insurance classifications based upon

6. Gilmore, supra note 4, at 576.
7. See, e.g., NAACP v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1992).
8. See Daniel A. Searing, Discrimination in Home Finance, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1113,
1113 (1973).
9. See, e.g., Badain, supra note 4, at 13-15 (interpreting redlining beyond geographical
limitations, encompassing all institutional practices that have the effect of limiting the availability or
affordability of housing insurance); Gilmore, supra note 4, at 566.
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membership in a protected class that have no grounding in sound
actuarial data.' °
Insurers have generally been loath to concede that the FHA has any
application to the insurance industry, and many deny it to this day."
Indeed, although several insurers have settled FHA lawsuits in recent
years, they did so while stubbornly insisting that the FHA does not
apply to insurance practices. The following comment, made by the
National Association of Independent Insurers in 1978, exemplifies the
insurance industry's historical approach to the fair housing laws: "'The
insurance industry refrains from moral pronouncements about its
customers. We measure risk as accurately as we can, applying
experience and objective criteria refined for more than two centuries.
We leave
it to others to speak of discrimination and other such moral
,, 4
terms.
However, as set forth in the following sections, insurers' resistance
against the FHA's application to insurance practices have been largely
unsuccessful.
B.

The Goals of the FHA and the Protected Classes

The FHA was first enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968.' In its original form, the FHA prohibited discrimination on
10. See Badain, supra note 4, at 15 & n.76 ("these practices may be justified to the extent that
they are supported by sound actuarial data-this is the distinction between fair and unfair
discrimination")(emphasis in original).
11. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint,
Nat'l FairHous. Alliance v. PrudentialIns. Co. of Am., No. 1:10CV02199 (EGS) (D.D.C. Jan. 9,
2001) (arguing that the FHA has no application to underwriting guidelines) (on file with author);
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Koontz v. Grange
Mut. Cas. Co., No. C2-98-318 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 2000) (same) (on file with author); Press Release,
National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, NAMIC Opposes Applying Fair Housing
Act to Insurance, June 19, 2000 (on file with author), available at http://www.namic.org; Carl
Horowitz, Legislation Aims FairHousing Laws at Insurance Firms, INVESTOR'S BuS. DAILY, Feb.
6, 1998, at A5 (quoting representatives from the Alliance of American Insurers and the American
Insurance Association as disavowing any application the FHA has on insurance); Russ Banham,
Insurers, Housing Groups Clash on Bias Law, J. COM., Nov. 6, 1997, at I IA (quoting
representative from National Association of Independent Insurers as denying that the FHA applied
to insurance).
12. See infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
13. See Squires, supra note 3, at 490 & n.7 (noting that the federal government has settled
FHA lawsuits against American Family, State Farm, Allstate, and Nationwide although the insurers
"persist[ed] in rejecting HUD's interpretation of the basic jurisdictional issue").
14. Gregory Squires, Policies of Prejudice: Risky Encounters with the Property Insurance
Business, CHALLENGE, July-Aug. 1996, at 45, 47 (quoting National Association of Independent
Insurers).
15. Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968).
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grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin.16 When it was passed,
the FHA's goal was not only to increase housing opportunities for racial
minorities, but also to promote integration for the benefit of all
Americans. 7 The Supreme Court has recognized that the FHA promotes
a "'policy
that Congress considered to be of the highest [national]
priority. ' 'I
Congress has expanded the FHA's anti-discrimination provisions
on two occasions. In 1974, the FHA was amended to include sex as a
protected class.'9 Very little legislative history accompanied the 1974
amendment, but one commentator has suggested that Congress intended
that the FHA's "ban on sex discrimination would end housing practices
based on sexual stereotypes. 2 ° In 1988, Congress again increased the
FHA's scope when it passed the Fair Housing Amendments Act
("FHAA"). 2 ' The FHAA banned housing discrimination on the basis of
familial status and of handicap.22
Although it was largely silent regarding the goal of proscribing
discrimination on the basis of familial status,23 Congress did give some
indication regarding the new amendments barring discrimination on the
basis of disability. The purpose, according to the legislative history, was
"to end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the
American mainstream." 24 Congress determined the right to be free from
housing discrimination to be "essential to the goal of independent
living., 25 Both federal and state courts have emphasized the
Congressional purpose of integrating persons with disabilities "into the
mainstream of society."26 In addition, Congress expressed its
16. See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 728 n.1 (1995) (citing FHA).
17.

See generally ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION

§ 2:3 (2002) (recounting legislative history of FHA); Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A
Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969) (same).
18. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
19. See Fair Housing Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. 93-383 § 808(b), 88 Stat. 633, 729 (1974).
20. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, § I IC:I.
21. Pub. L. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988).
22. See id. at 1622.
23. The motivation of the familial status discrimination proscriptions "was said to be to
protect families with children from discrimination in housing, without unfairly limiting housing
choices for elderly persons." SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at § IIE:I (citations omitted). It also
appears that the familial status provisions served to combat exclusionary rules that had a
disproportionate effect on minority households that might have had a large number of children. See
id.
24. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 788 F. Supp. 1555, 1561 n.5 (D. Kan. 1992); Rhodes v.
Palmetto Pathway Homes, Inc., 400 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1991) ("The [FHAA] articulates the
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understanding that "because of their special needs, handicapped persons
are often denied equal opportunities when they are treated like all other

non-handicapped persons. 27
C. Substantive Provisions of the FHA as Applicable to Insurance

As far as substantive provisions of the FHA are concerned, section
3604 of the FHA prohibits discrimination in the provision of insurance.

That section makes unlawful conduct which "make[s] unavailable or
den[ies], a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin., 28 The section further makes it
unlawful
[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable
or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of(A) that buyer or renter[;] (B) a person residing in or intending to
reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available; or
29
(C) any person associated with that buyer or renter.
The other FHA provision that potentially implicates insurance is

section 3605, which makes it "unlawful for any person or other entity
whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related
transactions to discriminate against any person in making available such
a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction. 30
In interpreting the FHA, courts must be mindful that "'Congress
intended [the FHA] to reach a broad range of activities that have the
effect of denying housing opportunities to a member of a protected
class."' 3 ' Consistent with the principle that the FHA is to be given a

"generous construction," courts have recognized that the "make
unavailable or deny" language of section 3604 is "as broad as Congress
could have made it."'32 The phrase reaches "every private and public

public policy of the United States as being to encourage and support handicapped persons' right to
live in a group home in the community of their choice.").
27. Parish of Jefferson v. Allied Health Care, Inc., CA Nos. 91-1199, 1200, 3959, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9124, at *19 (E.D. La. June 10, 1992); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 24-27.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1994).
29. Id. § 3604(f)(1) (citation omitted).
30. Id. § 3605(a).
31. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1359 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Mich.
Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 344 (6th Cir. 1994).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Bankert, 186 F. Supp. 2d 623, 628 (E.D.N.C. 2000) (quoting
United States v. Hughes Mem'l Home, 396 F. Supp. 544, 549 (W.D.Va. 1975)); Steptoe v. Beverly
Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F. Supp. 1313, 1318 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (quoting Zuch v. Hussey, 366 F.
Supp. 553, 557 (E.D. Mich. 1973)); United States v. Hous. Auth. of Chickasaw, 504 F. Supp. 716,
726 (S.D. Ala. 1980); Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1108
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practice that makes housing more difficult to obtain on prohibited
34
grounds,"33 and "may not be easily discounted or de-emphasized.
Indeed, courts have uniformly rejected defendants' arguments that, to
demonstrate a violation of the FHA, a plaintiff must show that housing
was actually denied. 5 As the Fowler court aptly stated: "[T]he FHA is
directed at the elimination of discriminatory conduct, not merely
discriminatory results. 36
Section 3604 also prohibits discrimination "against any person in
the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in
the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin."37 Again, the
same protections apply to disabilities, as the FHA makes it unlawful
"[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services
or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap
of-(A) that person; or (B) a person residing in or intending to reside
in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available; or (C) any
person associated with that person."38
Finally, the FHA provides that "discrimination includes ...a
refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices,
or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such
person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling."3 9 The Department
of Housing and Urban Development's ("HUD") regulations bolsters the
FHA by providing:
It shall be unlawful for any person to refuse to make reasonable
accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such
accommodations may be necessary to afford a handicapped person
equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling unit, including public
and common use areas. 40
(S.D. Ohio 1979); Heights Cmty. Cong. v. Rosenblatt Realty, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 1, 3 (N.D. Ohio 1975);
United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
33. Tyus v. Robin Constr. Corp., No. 92 C 2423, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16736, at **22-23
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 1992) (quoting Chickasaw, 504 F. Supp. at 726).
34. See, e.g., Bankert, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 628 (quoting Hughes Mem 'lHome, 396 F. Supp. at
549).
35. See, e.g., Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 97 F. Supp. 2d 602, 610-11 (D.N.J. 2000)
(citing numerous cases).
36. id. at611.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1994).
38. Id. § 3604(f)(2).
39. Id.§ 3604(f)(3)(B).
40. 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(a) (2002).
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In sum, the FHA, in defining unlawful conduct in the context of
housing practices, "creates the legal right to be free of injuries caused by
various, specific forms of discriminatory conduct., 4' Despite the relative
paucity of legislative history behind the FHA, courts have routinely
recognized that the FHA's anti-discrimination provisions are to be given
a liberal construction in order to effectuate their remedial purposes.42
Emphasizing this point, numerous courts have recognized that "all
practices which have the effect of denying dwellings on prohibited
grounds are therefor unlawful. 43 The FHA moreover prohibits
"sophisticated modes of discrimination as well as the obvious method of
discrimination.""
As already mentioned, insurers have long contended that the FHA
does not apply to insurance. Among other arguments, insurers often (and
accurately) point out that insurance is not expressly mentioned in the
FHA, and that several attempts to amend the FHA to explicitly include
insurance have been rejected by Congress. 4' Nevertheless, as early as
1978, HUD's general counsel asserted that the FHA applies to insurance,
because "[a]dequate insurance coverage is often a prerequisite to
obtaining financing. Insurance redlining, by denying or impeding
coverage makes mortgage money unavailable, rendering dwellings
'unavailable' as effectively as the denial of financial assistance on other

41. United States v. Bankert, 186 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (E.D.N.C. 2000).
42. See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 (1995) (the FHA antidiscrimination provisions are to be given a "generous construction"); Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill.
of Arlington Heights, 558
F.2d 1283, 1289 (7th Cir. 1977) (collecting cases holding that FHA is to be interpreted broadly);
Snyder v. Barry Realty, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 217, 219 (N.D. II1. 1996) ("It has long been recognized
that to give full measure to the Congressional purpose behind the FHA, courts have given broad
interpretation to the statute.") (quoting Baxter v. Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 731 (S.D. Il1. 1989));
United States v. Real Estate One, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1140, 1144 (E.D. Mich. 1977) ('"The Fair
Housing Act implements a policy to which Congress has accorded the highest national priority, and
it is to be liberally construed in accordance with that purpose."').
43. See, e.g., Bankert, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 628 (quoting United States v. Hughes Mem'l Home,
396 F. Supp. 544, 548 (W.D. Va. 1975)); accord United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Ed., 624 F. Supp.
1276, 1291 & 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (FHA prohibits "'every practice which has the effect of
making housing more difficult to obtain on prohibited grounds') (quoting United States v. City of
Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (N.D. Ohio 1980)); United States v. Hous. Auth. of Chickasaw,
504 F. Supp. 716, 726 (S.D. Ala. 1980); United States v. Am. Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, 442 F.
Supp. 1072, 1079 (N.D. I11.
1977); Heights Cmty. Cong. v. Rosenblatt Realty, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 1, 3
(N.D. Ohio 1975); United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
44. Bradley v. John M. Brabham Agency, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 27, 31 (D. S.C. 1978); cf
McDonald v. Verble, 622 F.2d 1227, 1234 (6th Cir. 1980); Williams v. The Matthews Co., 499 F.2d
819, 825 (8th Cir. 1974).
45. See Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419, 424 (4th Cir. 1984).
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grounds. 46 In 1989, HUD promulgated regulations interpreting the
FHA. In those regulations, HUD took the position that the FHA makes
illegal the act of "[r]efusing to provide ... property or hazard insurance
for dwellings or providing such services or insurance differently because
of [protected status]."47 And as will be discussed in the next section,
courts have overwhelmingly interpreted the FHA as applying to
insurance practices.

III.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE FHA AS APPLYING TO
INSURANCE UNDERWRITING PRACTICES

With one exception, courts have been in general agreement that the
FHA applies to insurance practices. While FHA/insurance cases rarely
are tried to judgment, these decisions make clear that plaintiffs can
challenge unfair discrimination by insurers under the FHA.
A.

Cases Involving Race Discrimination

The first court to consider whether the FHA applies to insurance4
was Dunn v. Midwestern Indemnity Mid-American Fire & Casualty Co. 1
Dunn involved allegations of classic racial redlining-the plaintiffs
(African-American homeowners) asserted that the defendant insurance
company refused to renew the plaintiffs' homeowner's insurance
because the houses were located in predominately African-American
neighborhoods. 49 The defendant insurers moved to dismiss, contending
that the FHA was not intended to apply to insurance practices. 0 The
Dunn court rejected this argument, holding that:
[s]ince insurance is a precondition to adequate housing, a
discriminatory denial of insurance would prevent a person
economically able to do so from buying a house. Consequently,
although insurance redlining is not expressly proscribed by the Act, it

is encompassed by both the broad language of § 3604(a) and the

46. Memorandum of The General Counsel of Housing and Urban Development to Chester C.
McGuire, Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity (Aug. 15, 1978), at 2; see also Dunn v.
Midwestem Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (quoting
same).
47. 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (2002).
48. 472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
49. See id. at 1107.
50. See id. at 1108.
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legislative design of the Act which seeks to eliminate discrimination
within the housing field.5
A few years after Dunn, the Fourth Circuit reached the opposite
conclusion in Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Cos.,52 and held that the
FHA does not prohibit unfair discrimination in insurance. In Mackey, an
African-American insurance agent brought an action against an insurer,
challenging the insurer's redlining practice as a violation of the agent's
civil rights and the FHA.5" The Fourth Circuit concluded that the FHA
does not reach insurance essentially because (1) Congress explicitly
prohibited discrimination by financial institutions, but failed to mention
insurance companies in the FHA, and (2) legislative efforts to get
insurance explicitly mentioned in the FHA following Dunn failed5 4
Emboldened by the Mackey decision, two insurance companies in
separate redlining lawsuits immediately asked Judge Rice in the
Southern District of Ohio to reconsider Dunn's application of the FHA
to insurance." However, Judge Rice reaffirmed Dunn's holding that the
FHA's provisions apply to the insurance industry.56 In particular, Judge
Rice agreed with Dunn that "the availability of insurance and the ability
to purchase a home go hand in hand and vary, in direct proportion, to
one another. 57 Judge Rice also criticized Mackey's reliance on
unsuccessful post-Dunn legislative efforts to amend the FHA to
specifically refer to insurance, noting that "[r]elying on this type of after
the fact legislative history is speculative at best, because the Court has
no way of knowing why the proposed amendments were rejected."58
In 1992, the Seventh Circuit, in NAACP v. American Family
Mutual Insurance Co.," similarly rejected Mackey and held that the FHA
51. Id.at1109.
52. 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984).
53. See id. at 420.
54. See id. at 423-25. For a discussion of the efforts to have insurance explicitly mentioned in
the FHA, see Badain, supra note 4, at 34-46.
55. See McDiarmid v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 604 F. Supp. 105, 106 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Pierce
v. Metro. Prop. & Liab. Ins., No. C-3-82-004, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24653, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug.
1, 1984). Judge Rice presided over both the McDiarmidand Pierce cases, although a different judge
had decided Dunn.
56. See McDiarmid,604 F. Supp. at 107-08; Pierce, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24653, at **3-7.
Undoubtedly in the interests of judicial economy, Judge Rice issued identical opinions in
McDiarmid and Pierce.
57. McDiarmid, 604 F. Supp. at 107; Pierce, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24653, at *5.
58. McDiarmid, 604 F. Supp. at 108; Pierce, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24653, at *6.
59. 978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992). For an extensive and humanistic chronicle of the facts of the
American Family case, see Jack Norman, Homeowners Ensure Company Does Right Thing With
American Family Settlement, Seven People "Make A Lasting Difference," MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Nov. 26, 1995, (Wisconsin Magazine), at 12.
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applies to insurance underwriting.6 The Seventh Circuit set forth the
plaintiffs' allegations against the defendant-insurer as follows:
Plaintiffs contend that a mortgage loan usually is essential to home
ownership, and that lenders are unwilling to provide credit unless the
borrower obtains insurance on the house that serves as security for the
loan. Higher premiums price some would-be buyers out of the market;
a refusal to write insurance excludes all buyers. If insurers redline
areas with large or growing numbers of minority residents, that
practice raises the cost of housing for black persons and also frustrates
their ability to live in integrated neighborhoods. Even if they achieve
61
their goal, they pay extra.
The district judge followed Mackey and dismissed the suit. 62 The
Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's holding that the FHA did not
reach insurance. 63 In a well-reasoned opinion, the Seventh Circuit refuted
the Mackey court's reasoning point-by-point. First, the Seventh Circuit
noted that, although the FHA does specifically refer to "financing" but
not insurance, there was no reason why the FHA could not apply to
both. 6' Second, the Seventh Circuit rejected Mackey's argument that
insurers are inherently involved in risk-assessment and must be allowed
to conduct such assessments without regard to the. FHA. 65 Third, the
Seventh Circuit observed that financial lenders are as much in the risk
assessment business as are insurers, yet Congress did not exempt them
from the provisions of the FHA.66 And because section 3604 was written
in general terms and did not specifically apply to any particular persons
or industry, the court concluded that it would be untenable to create a
60. See American Family, 978 F.2d at 301.
61. Id. at 290.
62. See id.
63. Seeid. at 301.
64. See id. at 298. Indeed, numerous courts have likewise found that a range of practices are
covered by the FHA, even though they are not expressly mentioned in the statute. See, e.g., Heights
Cmty. Cong. v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135, 143-44 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding that racial
steering violates the FHA); Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n v. County of St. Clair, 743
F.2d 1207, 1209 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that sectiom 3604(a) has been construed to "encompass
mortgage 'redlining,' insurance redlining, racial steering, exclusionary zoning decisions, and other
actions ... which directly affect the availability of housing to minorities"); United States v. City of
Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 576 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding exclusionary zoning ordinances "which have a
racially discriminatory effect . .. violate the [FHA]"); Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 660 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (holding that registration of deeds containing racially restrictive covenants violated the
FHA); United States v. Mass. Indus. Fin. Agency, 910 F. Supp. 21,28 (D. Mass. 1996) (holding that
denial of tax-exempt bond financing for school for emotionally disturbed students violated the
FHA).
65. See American Family, 978 F.2d at 298-99.
66. See id.
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special exemption for insurers out of a whole cloth.67 Fourth, as did
Judge Rice in McDiar'midand Pierce, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
Congress's failure to pass subsequent amendments was irrelevant to
determining the original congressional intent embodied in section 3604.68
Finally, the Seventh Circuit noted that HUD promulgated
S69 regulations
after Mackey that interpreted the FHA as applying to insurance. Noting
that HUD's interpretation of the FHA was entitled to great deference,7"
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the promulgation of 24 C.F.R.
§ 100.70(d)(4) effectively overruled Mackey.7
Although Mackey has not yet been repudiated by the Fourth Circuit,
one commentator has opined that the American Family opinion in will
"settle the matter of § 3604(a)'s coverage to insurance redlining. '72
Indeed, since American Family, every court to consider the issue has
held that the FHA applies to insurance. The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed
American Family in United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Metropolitan Human Relations Commission.7 ' The following year, in
Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Cisneros,4 the Sixth Circuit held that
an action for discriminatory redlining may be brought under the FHA.75
Several district courts have likewise followed Dunn and American
Family in holding that the FHA applies to insurance in race
discrimination cases.76
67. See id.
68. See id. at 299-300 (noting that subsequent amendments may fail for any number of
reasons).
69. See id. at 300 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4)).
70. See id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984)). Under the "Chevron doctrine" when Congress has expressly spoken to the precise question
at issue, the court must give effect to the express intent. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. However,
"if the statute is silent or ambiguous," the court must defer to the agency's interpretation if it is
reasonable. Id. at 843.
7. See American Family, 978 F.2d at 301.
72. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, § 15 at 13-62.
73. 24 F.3d 1008, 1015-16 (7th Cir. 1994).
74. 52F.3d 1351 (6thCir. 1995).
75. See id. at 1357-60.
76. See, e.g., Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46,
56 (D.D.C. 2002) (observing that the "'split' of authority on [whether the FHA applies to insurance]
is not as divided as the defendants portray it to be"); Nat'l. Fair Hous. Alliance v. Travelers Prop.
Cas. Corp., No. 00-1506 (JR), at 1-2 (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 2001) (unpublished opinion on file with author)
(denying defendant's motion for reconsideration from denial of motion to dismiss in FHA race
discrimination case against insurer); Lindsey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d 636, 641-43 (W.D.
Tenn. 1999) (finding that the FHA prohibits discriminatory refusal to renew property insurance);
United States v. Mass. Indus. Fin. Agency, 910 F. Supp. 21, 27 (D. Mass. 1996) ("Few, if any,
banks make home loans to uninsured borrowers. Thus, property insurers in effect have the power to
make housing unavailable to potential buyers."); Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., P-H Fair Housing-Fair
Lending Reporter, T 16,120 (W.D. Mo. 1996); Strange v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 867 F. Supp.
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All of the foregoing cases involved application of section 3604.
Until recently, courts were generally in agreement that section 3605 did
not reach insurance practices, holding generally that the section was
limited to institutions engaged in the making of commercial real estate
loans." However, the latest word on the issue is from the National Fair
Housing Alliance court, which held that "it is reasonable to conclude the
Congress intended that homeowners insurance fall within the scope of
section 3605's protections."78 The court noted that because section 3605
defined a real estate-related transaction as one involving a loan or
"'other financial assistance,"' the section indicated that "'financial
assistance"' should be broadly read to cover insurance as well. 9 The
National Fair Housing Alliance decision should resuscitate the
previously moribund debate over whether section 3605 applies to
insurance.
B.

Cases Involving DisabilityDiscrimination

FHA/insurance cases have not been limited to race discrimination.
Although discrimination on the basis of disability is not "redlining" in
the traditional sense, certain underwriting rules for housing insurance
have the same effect on people with disabilities that redlining does on

1209, 1213-15 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (deferring to HUD's position that FHA applies to insurance). See
also Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Farmers Ins. Group, Nos. C199-1339 & C100-2981, at 13-19 (Ohio
C.P. Mar. 29, 2001) (unpublished opinion on file with author) (allowing race discrimination
redlining claim brought under state fair housing laws to proceed); Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 703 N.E.2d 338, 339 (Ohio C.P. 1993) (same).
Indeed, given the documented examples of unfair discrimination in the insurance industry,
see supra note 3 and accompanying text, one wonders why more FHA lawsuits have not been filed
against the insurers. There are theories explaining why there have been relatively few challenges to
insurance redlining under the FHA. First, because of a lack of resources, fair housing-organizations
did not begin to seriously investigate the insurance industry for compliance with the FHA until the
late 1980s. In addition, although pre-FHA redlining was blatant, insurers rarely, if ever, openly
admit that they refuse to underwrite on the basis of race or other protected class. See Murray, supra
note 3, at 737-38 (noting that redlining and unfair discrimination in insurance have become far more
subtle in recent years). Also, insurance companies generally do not retain records of dwellings that
were denied coverage, which would enable a plaintiff to demonstrate a pattern of unfair
discrimination. See id. at 738. Relatedly, any underwriting data is controlled by the insurer, so
plaintiffs-even assuming that they are aware that they have been discriminated against-cannot
assess their claims until after a lawsuit is actually filed. See id. at 744-45.
77. See NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 297 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding
section 3065 does not encompass homeowners insurance); Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am.
Fire & Cas., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1110 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (same).
78. Nat'l FairHous. Alliance, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d at 58.
79. Id.
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minorities: they can effectively result in higher premiums, inferior
coverage, or the deprivation of insurance altogether. 0
In Wai v. Allstate Insurance Co.," and Koontz v. Grange Mutual
Casualty Co.,"' courts held for the first time that FHA claims alleging
"disability redlining" are actionable.83 In both cases, the plaintiffs
operated "group homes" for persons with disabilities. 84 Wai involved two
different and independent landlords.85 One of the plaintiff/landlords
rented her home to a group of moderately retarded women.86 The other
plaintiff/landlord in Wai, and the plaintiff/landlords in Koontz both
operated "Oxford Houses"-homes for recovering substance abusers
and alcoholics. 7 In both Wai and Koontz, the plaintiff/landlords were
80. Although the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., is
considered the most comprehensive anti-disability discrimination statute, the ADA has proved to be
ineffective against the insurance industry. See generally Jesse A. Langer, Note, Combating
Discriminatory Insurance Practices: Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 6 CONN. INS.
L.J. 435 (2000). Unlike the FHA, however, the ADA contains a "safe harbor" provision for
insurance companies. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201(c)(l)-(2). Because of this distinction, insurers faced
with FHA claims cannot take solace in ADA decisions that have been interpreted in the insurance
industry's favor.
81. 75 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999).
82. No. C2-98-318 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 1999) (unpublished decision on file with author).
83. The president of the National Association of Independent Insurers noted that the disability
discrimination lawsuits "brings [the insurance industry] into new territory." Jack Ramirez, Fair
Housing Council's lawsuit: Another Shot in a Widening Battle, NAT'L UNDERWRITER: PROP. &
CAS./RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION, July 28, 1997, at 23. Consistent with the insurance
industry's historical resistance to FHA compliance, Mr. Ramirez was extremely critical of the
lawsuits and encouraged the defendants "to mount an aggressive defense to accusations we consider
groundless and without merit." Id. at 27. Other prominent attorneys for financial lenders and
insurers have predicted that "it is reasonable to anticipate further litigation on the provision of
insurance for properties that house disabled residents." SANDLER ET AL., supra note 4, at
§ 2.02[3][c], at 2-27.
84. See Wai, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 2; Koontz, No. C2-98-318, at 2.
85. See Wai, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 2-3.
86. See id. at 3.
87. See id.; Koontz, No. C2-98-318, at 2. A comprehensive description of an Oxford House is
discussed in Tsombanidis v. City of West Haven, 180 F. Supp. 2d 262, 273 (D. Conn. 2001). Under
the Oxford House model, residents must be employed and pay rent to support the house, limiting the
level of government support and building vital self-esteem for the residents. See id. Indeed, Oxford
House's mission has been specifically recognized and endorsed by Congress. As one court noted:
Through its enactment of the.[FHAA] and the Federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
Congress has expressed a strong public policy favoring an end to discrimination in
housing on the basis of handicap andfavoring the establishment of housing programs for
recovering drug addicts and alcoholics. Indeed, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act's provision
encouraging the establishment of revolving loan funds by states to make start-up loans to
help establish group homes. for recovering drug addicts and alcoholics was based
specifically on the model of Oxford House. See 134 CONG. REC. E 3732 (daily ed. Nov.
10, 1988) (remarks of Rep. Madigan). Thus, Congress has directly endorsed Oxford
House itself as an organization worthy of public support because of its role in helping to
stem the national epidemic of alcohol and drug abuse.
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initially able to procure insurance from an insurance broker.88 However,
after the broker learned that the tenants were people with disabilities, the
insurance was withdrawn and the insurance companies either refused to
underwrite the homes altogether, or demanded significantly higher
premiums from the landlord. s9 The insurers in both Wai and Koontz
moved to dismiss the respective complaints, but both courts held that the
allegations were actionable under the FHA.90
C. Beyond Property/HazardInsurance
As discussed supra, both section 3604(b) and HUD's regulations
prohibit discrimination "in the provision of services ... in connection"
with the sale or rental of a dwelling. 9' Some courts have relied on the
fact that banks often require property or hazard insurance for a mortgage
in holding that insurance is a "service" necessary for housing. As the
American Family court bluntly put it: "No insurance, no loan; no loan,
no house; lack of insurance thus makes housing unavailable." 92
Insurers may argue that, even if the FHA applies to insurance, the
law is thus limited to property or hazard (as opposed to homeowner's or
liability) coverage. Insurers reason that, because homeowners' or
liability insurance is not necessary for financial procurement of a home,
only a denial of property insurance makes housing "unavailable" under
the FHA. In addition, insurers highlight the fact that the language of the
relevant HUD regulation only refers to property insurance.94
No court has ever accepted these arguments. Rather, insurers must
remain mindful in FHA cases that "[t]he critical determination is
whether defendant's conduct could hinder the ability of members of a
minority group to acquire a dwelling." 95 At least two courts have readily
Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 465 (D.N.J. 1992) (emphasis
added).
88. See Wai, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 3; Koontz, No. C2-98-318, at 2.
89. See Wai, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 3; Koontz, No. C2-98-318, at 2-3.
90. See Wai, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 5-8; Koontz, No. C2-98-318, at 2-4. Both the Wai and Koontz
cases settled before trial.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1994); see also 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(b) (2002).
92. NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 297 (7th Cir. 1992); accord
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1360 (6th Cir. 1995) ("the availability of
property insurance has a direct and immediate affect on a person's ability to obtain housing"); Wai,
75 F. Supp. 2d at 7-8.
93. See United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Metro. Human Relations Comm'n, 24 F.3d
1008, 1014 n.8 (7th Cir. 1994).
94. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4).
95. Tyus v. Robin Constr. Corp., No. 92 C 2423, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16736, at *25 (N.D.
I11.Nov. 2,1992).
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applied the FHA to homeowners' and liability insurance, concluding that
the availability of housing can certainly be affected by discrimination in
liability coverage.
In United Farm Bureau, the Seventh Circuit upheld an FHA claim
against an insurer after the insurer declined to renew the plaintiffs
homeowner's policy because he lived in a racially mixed neighborhood
with a perceived high crime rate.96 The insurer argued that, because only
property insurance is pro forma necessary for a mortgage, alleged
discrimination in homeowners' insurance should not be actionable under
the FHA.97 The court rejected this argument:
We are not persuaded by [the insurer's] argument. By refusing to issue
a homeowner's insurance policy, the cost of owning a home or real
property is increased, perhaps prohibitively. The property owner would
be required to carry the risks and bear the costs for all injury, loss, or
damage other than for the limited situations covered by hazard
insurance. This undoubtedly could make owning and retaining real
property unavailable; simply preventing foreclosure is not sufficient to
make housing "available.""
Similarly, the Wai court explained:
If, in order to rent to disabled persons, a landlord must risk losing her
home through loss of mortgage financing, loss of catastrophe
insurance, and loss of liability insurance, she will be disinclined to

rent to disabled persons. Such powerful disincentives to rent to
disabled persons, make housing unavailable to them. 99
Surely, a loss of liability insurance tends to make housing
"unavailable" within the meaning of the FHA, even if a homeowner
might still obtain the basic hazard insurance required for a mortgage. '°°
96. See United Farm Bureau, 24 F.3d at 1010.
97. See id. at 1014 n.8.
98. Id.
99. Wai v. Allstate Ins. Co., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1999) (emphasis added); see also
Lindsey v. Allstate Ins. Co, 34 F. Supp. 2d 636, 641-43 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (finding that the FHA
prohibits discriminatory refusal to underwrite homeowners' insurance); Dunn v. Midwestern Indem.
Mid-Am. Fire & Cas., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1109, 1112 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (same).
100. On a related point, insurers have been known to argue in FHA cases (quite cynically) that
housing has not been made unavailable because the plaintiff could still purchase the desired
coverage from another company. It scarcely requires authority to say that an insurer should not be
allowed to excuse its own discriminatory conduct by contending that the plaintiff would not
encounter discrimination elsewhere. Cf McDonald v. Verble, 622 F.2d 1227, 1233 (6th Cir. 1980)
(allowing FHA suit to proceed against real estate brokers who preferred "'not to sell the property to
blacks,"' even though plaintiffs ended up purchasing property). See also Tyus v. Robin Constr.
Corp., No. 92 C 2423, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16736, at **22-23 (N.D. II1. Nov. 2, 1992) (quoting
United States v. Hous. Auth. of Chickasaw, 504 F. Supp. 716, 726 (S.D. Ala. 1980)) (stating that the
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Insurers' arguments that the FHA is limited to property insurance only
also run counter to the principle that "all practices which have the effect
of denying dwellings on prohibited grounds are therefore unlawful."'0 '
IV.

INSURERS' THRESHOLD DEFENSES AGAINST FHA SUITS

Insurers have not accepted application of the FHA to their business
lightly. In addition to generally denying that the FHA applies to
insurance, insurers usually attempt other threshold defenses to avoid
application of the FHA to underwriting practices. Most often, insurers
contend that the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, or the filed-rate doctrine preclude FHA lawsuits against
insurers. None of these arguments have been successful.
A.

The McCarran-FergusonAct

One of insurers' favorite threshold defenses in FHA cases is that
the FHA is preempted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.'0 2 This argument
has been rejected so many times, one wonders why insurers continue to
pursue such a fruitless and time-wasting argument in FHA cases.' 3 The
time may not be far off when a court imposes sanctions against an
insurer for raising a McCarren-Ferguson defense against an FHA
lawsuit.
1. Background to the McCarran-Ferguson Act
Prior to 1944, it was accepted that insurance regulation was solely
the province of the states, because insurance was not considered to be
interstate commerce.' °4 States thus enjoyed unfettered power to tax and
regulate the insurance industry. In United States v. South-Eastern
UnderwritersAss'n,'05 the United States Supreme Court held for the first
time that insurance was a transaction of interstate commerce subject to
federal regulation (specifically, federal antitrust law).' 6 In response to

FHA prohibits all conduct that has the effect of "mak[ing] housing more difficult to obtain on
prohibited grounds"); cases cited supra note 32.
101. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
102. 15U.S.C.§§ 1011-15 (2000).
103. One fair housing advocate has likened the McCarran-Ferguson Act defense in FHA cases
to the "emperor's new clothes"-it "simply does not exist." See Stephen M. Dane, Letter to the

Editor: McCarran-Ferguson a Naked Defense,

NAT'L UNDERWRITER:

PROP. &

CAS./RISK &

BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION, Nov. 13, 1995, at 31.

104. See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868).
105. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
106. See id. at 560-62.
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the South-Eastern Underwriters decision, Congress passed the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, thus reaffirming the primacy of state regulation
of insurance. 7
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that "[t]he business of
insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws
of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business."'0 8 With respect to federal regulation, the Act continues in
pertinent part: "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance, ... unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance." 10 9
Because the McCarran-Ferguson Act is an exemption from the
antitrust laws, it is to be narrowly construed."0 Similarly, in order to
promote federal statutory and regulatory interests, courts likewise afford
the term "business of insurance" as narrow an interpretation as
possible."'
2. Judicial Interpretation of McCarran-Ferguson in FHA Cases
As discussed supra, the FHA has been construed to apply to the
sale of homeowners' insurance." 2 Also, it is true that the FHA does not
specifically refer to insurance." 3 Therefore, the McCarran-Ferguson Act
would bar an FHA claim,only if application of the FHA to conduct that
constitutes the "business of insurance"
would thereby "invalidate,
4
impair, or supersede" a state statute.'
Insurers typically present their McCarran-Ferguson defenses in
FHA cases with the following logic: virtually every state requires that
insurers file insurance policy forms and rating rules, along with the
proposed rates to be charged, with the state insurance regulatory

107. See generally Gilmore, supra note 4, at 568-69 (describing development of McCarranFerguson). For a general argument of the inefficiencies of state regulation of insurance, see Badain,
supra note 4, at 19-20.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2000).
109. Id. § 1012(b).
110. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979); Duane v.
Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 784 F. Supp. 1209, 1220 (D. Md. 1992) ("When considering the effect of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, courts have concluded with near uniformity that the preemptive reach
of the Act must be narrowly construed."), aff'd, 37 F.3d 1036 (4th Cir. 1994).
111. See, e.g., Anglin v. Blue Shield of Va., 693 F.2d 315, 320 (4th Cir. 1982) ("it is readily
apparent that the courts, including this one, have often given a narrow interpretation to the term
[business of insurance]"); Cochran v; Paco, Inc., 606 F.2d 460, 467 (5th Cir. 1979).
112. See supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
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department prior to their sale to the public. Insurers are usually
forbidden under state law to deviate from their filed policy forms, rating
rules, and rates without express approval and consent from the state
insurance regulators. Therefore, insurers reason that any change in their
underwriting rates necessarily usurps the power of state regulators to
approve underwriting rates.
Insurers also proffer a similar argument as to why the FHA violates
state insurance laws. Virtually every state prohibits "unfair
discrimination" in insurance rates." 5 Insurers often argue that anything
other than neutral underwriting rates will conflict with state laws against
unfair discrimination in insurance, because. (so the argument goes)
providing favorable rates to one insured over another is inherently

"unfair."' 16

Although insurer/defendants have made these arguments nearly
every time they have faced an FHA claim,"' no court has ever applied
McCarran-Ferguson to the FHA. In fact, every court that has considered
the issue has concluded that McCarran-Ferguson does not affect the
FHA."' The reasoning of these cases is quite simple: the McCarranFerguson Act only preempts federal statutes that are in direct conflict

115. See SANDLER ETAL., supra note 4, at § 2.03[l][a][ii][E],'at 2-42.
116. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1361 (6th Cir. 1995).
117. See, e.g., Squires, supra note 3, at 495 (noting that insurers frequently rely on the
McCarran-Ferguson Act to avoid FHA lawsuits). In a recent lawsuit filed in the federal district court
in the District of Columbia alleging unfair discrimination, the defendant/insurer did not set forth a
McCarran-Ferguson defense in its (ultimately unsuccessful) motion to dismiss. See Memorandum of
Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance v.
Prudential is. Co., No. 1:10CV02199 (EGS) (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 2001) (on file with author).
Prudential's motion may signal that insurers have given up on the McCarran-Ferguson defense in
FHA cases.
118. See, e.g., Nationwide, 52 F.3d at 1363 (finding that the FHA would not conflict with Ohio
insurance law); United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Metro. Human Relations Comm'n, 24 F.3d
1008, 1016 (7th Cir. 1994) (FHA would not conflict with Indiana insurance law); NAACP v.
American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 297 (7th Cir. 1992) (Wisconsin law); Mackey v.
Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419, 421 (4th Cir. 1984) (North Carolina law); Dehoyos v. Allstate
Corp., No. SA-01-CA-1010-FB, at 4-7 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2002) (unpublished decision on file with
author) (Texas and Florida law); Koontz v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., No. C2-98-318, at 10-11 (S.D.
Ohio Jan. 21, 2000) (Ohio law); Wai v. Allstate Ins. Co., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1999)
(Maryland law); Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., P-H Fair Housing-Fair Lending Reporter, IN 16,120,
16,120.4-.5 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (Missouri law); McDiarmid v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 604 F. Supp.
105, 108-09 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (Ohio law); Pierce v. Metro. Prop. & Liab. Ins., No. C-3-82-004,
1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24653, at **7-13 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 1984) (Ohio law); Dunn v. Midwestern
Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1111-12 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (Ohio law). See
also Moore v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1222-23 (lth Cir. 2001) (holding that
applying 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 against alleged discrimination by life insurer would not affect
Alabama insurance law).
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with state insurance laws." 9 In addition, courts note that, while
underwriting may constitute the business of insurance, unfair (and
hence, illegal) discriminatory underwriting does not.'20
It is not enough for insurers to point to state insurance laws
proscribing "unfair discrimination" and claim that McCarran-Ferguson
thus precludes an FHA suit. At best, the FHA only provides the same
federal proscription against unfair discrimination in insurance as do
states. As the Seventh Circuit bluntly explained, "[d]uplication is not
conflict."'' Indeed, arguments that application of the Fair Housing Act
is in "direct conflict" with state laws preventing unfair discrimination in
insurance are facially illogical. Common sense suggests that states'
policies of preventing unfair discrimination in insurance are "likely to be
furthered, not frustrated, by the application of the FHA."'22 No insurer
has identified a state law that is in direct conflict with the FHA, and the
author of this Article is not aware of the existence of such a law. Nor has
there been an instance in which a state has intervened in an
FHA/insurance 2case
to argue that the FHA is at odds with that state's
3
laws.'
insurance
Also complicating matters for insurers wishing to assert McCarranFerguson defenses is the fact that the majority of states (and the District
of Columbia) have enacted fair housing laws that parallel the mandates
of the FHA.' 24 It is difficult (if hot impossible) for insurers to contend
119. One commentator has urged that the "direct conflict" test is inconsistent with the original
purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and should be disregarded in favor of a less stringent
standard. See generally Farrokh Jhabvala, The "Direct Conflict" Test for First Clause McCarranFerguson Cases, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 1147 (1998). No court has ever adopted this reasoning, and it
appears that the "direct conflict" test is well-settled among courts.
120. See, e.g., Duane v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 784 F. Supp. 1209, 1221 (D. Md. 1992). In
Duane, there was a "failure to demonstrate a positive relation between the policy of refusing to
underwrite [a protected class] and the general practice of underwriting and ratemaking." Id. As
such, the court held that McCarran-Ferguson was not applicable. See id.
121. American Family, 978 F.2d at 295; accord McDiarmid, 604 F. Supp. at 109 (concluding
that the FHA "does not permit anything that [state law] prohibits and [the FHA] does not prohibit
anything that [state law] permits"); LEE R. Russ, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 4:5, at 4-12 (1996)
("Application of the Fair Housing Act is not subject to McCarran preemption merely because of an
existing state insurance law banning discrimination.").
122. Wai, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 5 n.4.
123. See American Family, 978 F.2d at 297 (noting that state did not intervene in the American
Family case to argue that the federal law at issue would frustrate its scheme of insurance
regulation); cf.Moore, 267 F.3d at 1222 (stating the same in section 1983 lawsuit against insurers
for racial discrimination).
124. Using Ohio as an example, the Ohio Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in
homeowner's insurance on the basis of handicap, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(H)(4)
(Anderson 2001), and also mandates "reasonable accommodations" when necessary to make
housing available. See id. § 4112.02(H)(19). As of 1988, the following states had laws that were
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that the nondiscrimination and reasonable accommodations mandates of
the FHA "conflict" with state insurance law and are therefore preempted
when the state has adopted the same mandates as has the FHA.
Nor can insurers take any solace in the fact that the most prominent
of the McCarran-Ferguson/FHA cases have involved allegations of
racial redlining, or intentional discrimination, as opposed to disparate
impact or reasonable accommodation claims. Based on the reasoning of
the redlining cases, there is no reason to believe that a plaintiff asserting
a disparate impact theory or a reasonable accommodation theory is
precluded from doing so by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, absent a
conflicting state insurance law or regulation.' Several courts have
recognized disparate impact and reasonable accommodation theories in
FHA cases.116
Nor have courts been receptive to arguments that the remedies
provided by the FHA would generally "upset" a state regulatory scheme.
Many states do not allow for a private right of action to enforce state
"unfair discrimination" insurance laws. The insurers in both Nationwide
"substantially equivalent" to the FHA: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia.
See Implementation of The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1983, 53 Fed. Reg. 44,992, 45,019-20
(Nov. 7, 1988). Since that time, Georgia, Ohio, Texas, Utah, and Vermont have enacted fair housing
legislation. See SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at Appendix C.
125. It is also highly questionable whether McCarran-Ferguson can apply in such a piecemeal
fashion. The author is not aware of any decision in which a court held that a certain portion of a
federal statute was preempted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act whereas other portions of the same
statute were not. In any event, courts have rejected McCarran-Ferguson defenses in disparate impact
claims and reasonable accommodation claims. See Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., P-H Fair HousingFair Lending Reporter, I 16,120, 16,120.3-.5 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (rejecting defense as to disparate
impact claim)); Wai, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 5 (rejecting as to both types of claims).
126. See supra notes 80-90 & infra notes 211-22 and accompanying text. Indeed, courts have
also noted that their states' insurance scheme have little to do with civil rights laws, but instead are
only concerned with the "minutia of running an insurance company." See Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 704 N.E.2d 667, 671 (Ohio C.P. 1997) (holding that Ohio insurance
scheme "addresses the minutia of running an insurance company; it does not deal with such broader
topics as the civil rights implications of offering certain types of insurance to certain groups of
people"). In addition, in both McDiarmid and Pierce, Judge Rice specifically considered whether
application of the FHA would "'invalidate, impair or supersede' OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3901.21(M)--which prohibits "unfair" discrimination in insurance. See McDiarmid, 604 F. Supp.
at 108-09; Pierce v. Metro. Prop. & Liab. Ins., No. C-3-82-004, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24653, at
**9-12 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 1984). After examining the legislative history of the statute, Judge Rice
concluded that O.R.C. § 3901.21(M) did not address insurance redlining, but rather was to
"eliminat[e] ... sex discrimination in the business of insurance." McDiarmid, 604 F. Supp. at 109;
Pierce, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24653, at *11. Accordingly, McCarran-Ferguson posed no bar to the
FHA claim.
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and American Family contended that allowing private remedies against
insurers under the FHA would impair state insurance schemes. 27 Both
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits rejected these arguments, reasoning that
the difference in types of remedies offered by the FHA and states is not
sufficient to warrant preemption.' As the Sixth Circuit later explained
in a non-FHA case, "[a] party seeking to invoke McCarran-Ferguson
cannot simply point to additional procedural measures included in a
federal law without identifying some substantive aspect of the state law
'
that is being invalidated, impaired or superseded." 29
This is not to suggest that the McCarran-Ferguson Act can never
apply to an FHA case. As the Seventh Circuit noted in American Family,
states are free to enact insurance laws or regulations that authorize
insurance redlining or otherwise endorse the use of underwriting
methods that would be prohibited by the FHA. 3 Hence, if a stateauthorized housing underwriting criteria that would result in a disparate
impact on groups protected under the FHA, then McCarran-Ferguson
would preempt any recourse that a plaintiff had under the FHA. Given
that many states already mandate fair housing under state law, such
circumstances are extremely unlikely.
B.

The PrimaryJurisdictionDoctrine

Closely related to the McCarran-Ferguson defense is the "primary
jurisdiction" defense. As explained by the Eighth Circuit:
Primary jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine whereby a court of
competent jurisdiction may dismiss or stay an action pending a
resolution of some portion of the action by an administrative agency. It
is a doctrine specifically applicable to claims properly cognizable in
court that contain some issue within the special competence of an
administrative agency. This doctrine is often confused with the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The exhaustion
doctrine ordinarily requires a plaintiff to pursue relief, when available,
from an administrative agency before proceeding to the courts. Until
that recourse is exhausted, suit is premature and must be dismissed.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires a court to enable a
127. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1531, 1363 (6th Cir. 1995); American
Family, 978 F.2d at 297.
128. See Nationwide, 52 F.3d at 1363; American Family, 978 F.2d at 297.
129. Kenty v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A., 92 F.3d 384, 392 (6th Cir. 1996).
130. American Family, 978 F.2d at 297 ("If Wisconsin wants to authorize redlining, it need
only say so."); Raymond A. Guenter, Rediscovering the McCarran-Ferguson Act's Commerce
Clause Limitation, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 349 (2000) (stating "that if a state insurance law did
authorize racial discrimination, the Act would cause such a law to prevail over the [F-1A]").
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referral to an agency, staying further proceedings so as to give the
parties reasonable opportunity to seek an administrative ruling."'
Thus, insurers argue, because all states have departments of
insurance overseeing insurance practices, any complaints of unfair
discrimination in underwriting are the province of state administrative
agencies, rather than federal courts.
Like the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the primary jurisdiction doctrine
has not been availing as a defense against FHA lawsuits. The problem
with the primary jurisdiction defense is that it was never intended to
abrogate plaintiffs' federal statutory rights in favor of administrative
enforcement of state insurance regulations. Federal civil rights statutes
such as the FHA take precedence over state administrative remedies.
The Supreme Court has long held that it would defeat the purposes of
providing a federal remedy for discrimination if the "assertion of a
federal claim in a federal court must await an attempt to vindicate the
same claim in a state court."' 32 At least four courts have rejected a
primary jurisdiction defense in FHA cases.'3 3
C. The Filed Rate Doctrine
Another argument sometimes made by defendant insurers is that
their policy forms and rating rules must necessarily be lawful because
they have been filed and approved with the state insurance regulators.
Although this argument is usually conflated with an argument that the
FHA does not recognize a disparate impact theory against insurers,'3 4 it
is actually a derivation of the so-called "filed rate doctrine." Typically,
the filed rate doctrine bars judicial recourse against a regulated entity
based upon allegations that the entity's "filed rate" is too high, or
131. Jackson v. Swift Eckrich, Inc., 53 F.3d 1452, 1455-56 (8th Cir. 1995) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
132. McNeese v. Bd. of Ed. for Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 187, 373 U.S. 668, 672 (1963).
133. See, e.g., Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46,
61 (D.D.C. 2002); Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co.; P-H Fair Housing-Fair Lending Reporter,
16,120,
16,120.5-.6 (W.D. Mo. 1996); Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 704 N.E.2d 667,
671 (Ohio C.P. 1997) (finding that the Ohio legislature did not intend the Superintendent of
Insurance to have primary jurisdiction over insurance redlining claims); Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v.
Farmers Ins. Group, Nos. C199-1339 & C100-2981, at 19-21 (Ohio C.P. Mar. 29, 2001)
(unpublished opinion on file with author).
There are other reasons why the primary jurisdiction doctrine does not apply in FHA
cases. For example, primary jurisdiction does not exist when an administrative agency is without
authority to grant the relief requested. See Barbara v. NYSE, 99 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 1996). Often, if
not always, state insurance agencies have no authority to award compensatory damages (as are
usually sought in FHA cases against insurers). See, e.g., D.C. CODE. ANN. § 35-2709 (2002).
134. See infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
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otherwise unfair or unlawful.'35 However, the doctrine is most
appropriate to entities that operate a monopoly (such as public utilities),
or at least are required to charge a fixed rate.'3 6 To date, the filed-rate
doctrine has never been applied in the homeowners' or property
insurance context where the insurance product at issue is a specific type
of policy.' 37 Indeed, the Canady court specifically rejected as
"nonsensical" a filed-rate doctrine attack on the FHA.138
Even assuming that the filed-rate doctrine was applicable to
homeowners' insurance, if defendant insurers are going to attempt to
take advantage of the filed-rate doctrine to argue that they are immune
from an FHA disparate impact analysis, plaintiffs ought likewise to be
able to utilize the recognized defenses to the doctrine in rebuttal.
Typically, the filed-rate doctrine has been held inapplicable in the
insurance context because (1) few state insurance schemes allow for
review of the approved rates, and (2) plaintiffs rarely have any
alternative remedies to challenge unfair underwriting rates. 39 The Ninth
Circuit, for example, has held that, unless insurers can demonstrate that
their filed rates were subject to meaningful review rather than mere
"approval" by state regulators, the fact that the rates were approvedwithout more-does not preclude a federal challenge to the rates.' 40 As
135. The doctrine was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Keogh v. Chicago &
Northwestern Railway, Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922), which dismissed allegations of antitrust violations
against the defendant's shipping rates that had been submitted to and approved by the Interstate
Commerce Commission. The "filed rate doctrine" is sometimes known as the "filed tariff doctrine"
or the "Keogh doctrine."
The filed rate doctrine has been subject to much criticism, and has been attacked as
outdated. See, e.g., Square D. Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1347, 1352-64
(2d Cir. 1985) (Friendly, J.); Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 317-20
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
136. See Allan Kanner, The Filed Rate Doctrine and Insurance FraudLitigation, 76 N.D. L.
REV. 1, 27 (2000).
137. See id.
138. Canady, P-H Fair Housing-Fair Lending Reporter, at 16,120.7. The court also noted that
the "vast majority of cases applying the filed-rate doctrine have dealt with the transportation
industry or disputes involving utilities." Id. The court ultimately rejected the filed-rate doctrine
attack on the FHA because, in the insurance industry, "there is no one set price charged for all
persons desiring insurance." Id.
139. See Kanner, supra note 136, at 11-18. Kanner reports that "[glenerally, efforts to use the
filed rate doctrine in the insurance context have been unsuccessful, since its doctrinal foundations
make little sense in the insurance context. Therefore, the overwhelming majority of federal and state
courts ... have never applied the filed rate doctrine to insurance." Id. at 2. But see SANDLER ET AL.,
supra note 4, § 2.02[3][a][ii][C], at 2-21 (arguing that filed rate doctrine is applicable to insurance).
140. In Brown v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit
considered allegations that the defendant-insurers violated federal antitrust laws. The defendants
argued for application of the filed rate doctrine because the rates had been approved by state
regulators. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument:
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such, as dubious as it is to apply the justifications of the filed-rate
doctrine to underwriting criteria that have been "approved" by the state,
this type of frontal attack against an FHA claim is especially vulnerable
if the particular state does not have an intense insurance regulatory
scheme.
V.

THEORIES OF LIABILITY UNDER THE

FHA

There are three possible theories upon which a plaintiff can assert
an FHA claim: (1) intentional discrimination/disparate treatment;
(2) disparate impact; and (3) reasonable accommodation. Most often,
plaintiffs predicate their FHA claims on either an intentional4
'
discrimination/disparate treatment theory, or a disparate impact theory.'
The remaining theory-that the defendant failed to provide the plaintiff
with a reasonable accommodation'42-is only applicable in the context of
disability discrimination.
A. IntentionalDiscrimination/DisparateTreatment
Proving intentional discrimination under the FHA "is not usually a
heavy burden.' 4 It has been said that cases alleging intentional

In the present case, Ticor makes much of the fact that the filed rates are the only rates
which it may legally charge in Arizona and Wisconsin. However, if those rates were the
product of unlawful activity prior to their being filed and were not subjected to
meaningful review by the state, then the fact that they were filed does not render them
immune from challenge. The absence of meaningful state review allows the insurers to
file any rates they want. Therefore, the act of filing does not legitimize a rate arrived at
by improper action.
Id. at 393-94. However, at least one court has applied the filed rate doctrine in circumstances
identical to those in Ticor Title because it found that its state insurance scheme was comprehensive
enough to justify application of the doctrine. See Amundson & Assocs. Art. Studio, Ltd. v. Nat'l
Council on Compensation Ins., Inc., 988 P.2d 1208 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999). The Amundson court
based its decision at least partially on the fact that the state insurance scheme was enacted after the
state antitrust laws, and applied the "'settled rule of statutory construction that where an
irreconcilable conflict exists between statutes, the latest enactment will be held to supersede, repeal
or supplant the earlier by implication; the later enactment must prevail."' Id. at 1212. Thus, even
assuming arguendo that the "filed rate doctrine" can be applied to underwriting criteria as opposed
to a single rate (as was the case in both Ticor Title and Amundson), most, if not all, states have
enacted fair housing laws that parallel the federal FHA. See supra note 124. It seems virtually
certain that every state fair housing statute post-dates the enactment of its counterpart state
insurance scheme, and accordingly, must be deemed controlling pursuant to the same canons of
statutory construction as those cited in Amundson.
141. See, e.g., Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 460 (D.N.J.
1992).
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3) (1994).
143. O'Neal v. Ala. Dep't of Pub. Health, 826 F. Supp. 1368, 1374 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
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discrimination "account for most of the litigation under Title VIII.'''44 At
least so far, such has been true for FHA insurance cases as well,
although disparate impact and reasonable accommodation cases are
certainly making headway in that regard. Courts accept proof of
intentional discrimination by both direct and indirect evidence. Each will
be discussed in turn.
1. Direct Evidence in FHA/Insurance Cases
a. In General
In most cases, proving an FHA violation by means of direct
evidence will be fairly straightforward. Intentional discrimination in the
housing insurance context can result when an insurer cancels its
insured's homeowner's policy because of the insured's protected status,
refuses to offer a policy, offers a policy providing less coverage, and/or
charges a higher premium because of the applicant's protected status. It
makes no difference whether the disparate treatment was conducted by
the insurer itself or its agents-courts have consistently held that
defendants cannot escape FHA liability by distancing themselves from
their agents. 145
It is not necessary to show that the protected status was the sole
reason that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff-one need
only show that the protected status was a significant factor.'4 6 Moreover,
it is not necessary for the plaintiff to demonstrate that the insurer acted
with an "evil" motive. 47 Courts deciding FHA claims occasionally
SCHWEMM, supra note 17, § 10:2.
145. See, e.g., Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 433 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing numerous cases);
Heights Cmty. Cong. v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135, 141 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting that attempts
to distinguish between principal and agent has "consistently been rejected in Fair Housing Act
cases"). But see Andrew L. Sandler et al., The Liability of Insurersfor Alleged Discriminatory
Conduct of Independent Agents, 17-3 J. INS. REG. 327, 334-35 (1999) (arguing that whether or not
insurer had control over agent is a fact-specific inquiry).
146. See, e.g., Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995) ("'To prove
discriminatory intent, a plaintiff need only show that the handicap of the potential residents [of a
group home] ...was in some part the basis for the policy being challenged,"' in other words,
disability discrimination) (quoting Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, 823 F.
Supp. 1285, 1295 (D. Md. 1993)); Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198, 1201 (5th Cir. 1982)
(showing race discrimination); O'Neil, 826 F. Supp. at 1374 (citing race discrimination and stating
"it is not necessary to show that the defendant acted out of malice or ill will or even that the
defendant was solely motivated by a proscribed animus-it is sufficient to show that the
discrimination was meant to occur and that it occurred").
147. As one court explained in rejecting an "evil motive"/animus standard:
A person who attempts to prevent a black family from buying the house next door
because the presence of a black family on the block will decrease property values

144.
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equate "evil motive" with "animus," which can lead to apparently
inconsistent results.4 ' This apparent inconsistency is illusory, however. 49
Courts that say animus is not required to establish an FHA violation
50
may be understood as holding only that "ill will" is not required.'
Conversely, decisions holding that animus is required to establish an
FHA violation may be understood as holding only that, when the
defendant makes housing unavailable, he or she takes the potential
homeowner or resident's protected status into account. So long as the
violates the Fair Housing Act just as assuredly as a person who attempts to prevent a
black family from buying the house next door because that person dislikes all black
people.
United States v. City of Birmingham, 538 F. Supp. 819, 830 (E.D. Mich. 1982), aff'd as modified,
727 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1984). The "no evil motive" rule of intentional discrimination is applicable to
other classes protected under the FHA. See, e.g., United States v. Lepore, 816 F. Supp. 1011, 1021
(M.D. Pa. 1991) ("A refusal to rent based on familial status contravenes the Fair Housing Act
regardless of whether the refusal is based on some sort of personal animus toward children.");
United States v. Reece, 457 F. Supp. 43, 48 (D. Mont. 1978) (landlord's excuse that he did not want
to rent to women for fear that they may be raped amounted to intentional discrimination despite lack
of ill will toward women).
148. Compare Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1501 ("Specifically with regard to housing discrimination,
a plaintiff need not prove the malice or discriminatory animus of a defendant to make out a case of
intentional discrimination where the defendant expressly treats someone protected by the FHAA in
a different manner than others"), O'Neal, 826 F. Supp. at 1374 (finding ill will or discriminatory
animus are not required for intentional discrimination), and United States v. Scott, 788 F. Supp.
1555, 1561 (D. Kan. 1992) (finding the same), with Smith & Lee Assocs. Inc. v. City of Taylor, 102
F.3d 781, 794 (6th Cir. 1996) (dicta requiring a showing of animus in FHA disability discrimination
case), and Sofarelli v. Pinellas County, 931 F.2d 718, 723 (1 lth Cir. 1991) ("Because Sofarelli
concedes that he 'is not aware of and does not allege' any claims that the Pinellas County Sheriff
acted with racial animus ... Sofarelli fails to state a claim under the Fair Housing Act.") (citation
omitted).
149. The differences in the above opinions as to whether "animus" is necessary to prove a
disparate treatment claim is attributable to variation in the definitions that courts use for the term
"animus." The Second Circuit, for example, has held that "animus" is not synonymous with "ill
will," but rather describes a person's "basic attitude or intention." See, e.g., N.Y. State Nat'l Org.
for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1359 (2d Cir. 1989); accord Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1993) (defining "animus" 9tandard in gender discrimination
case as having "a purpose that focuses upon women by reason of their sex ... directed specifically
at women as a class") (emphasis omitted). Black's defines "animus" as "mind; soul; intention;
disposition; design; will; [or] that which informs the body." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 87 (6th ed.
1990). This definition is consistent with the definitions of Terry and Bray. However, witnesses
before Congress defined "animus" as a hostile or malevolent intention. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R.
1133 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender, 103d Cong. 101 (1993) (prepared statement of James
Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice) (quoting
Webster's dictionary as defining "animus" as "prejudiced and often spiteful"). Webster's itself
provides several definitions of the term, including both the Terry/Bray definition as well as the ill
will. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 86 (1986) ("animus" definitions include
(I) "pervading and characteristic approach or treatment ... dominant tone" ... (3) "ill will,
antagonism .... ").
150. See supra note 146.
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plaintiff suffered discrimination because of any protected status, an FHA
violation has occurred.
b.

In Disability Discrimination Cases

A few words should be said about disparate treatment against
people with disabilities. Courts considering FHA disability
discrimination cases must recognize that disability discrimination is not
perfectly analogous to race discrimination.' The Supreme Court has
noted that discrimination against the handicapped is "most often the
product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and
indifference--of benign neglect.""'5 This view is consistent with the
FHAA's legislative history, as the House Report accompanying the
FHAA states:
The Fair Housing Amendments Act, like Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, is a clear pronouncement of a
national commitment to end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with
handicaps from the American mainstream. It repudiates the use of
stereotypes and ignorance, and mandates that persons with handicaps
be considered as individuals. Generalized perceptions about disabilities
and unfounded speculations about threats
to safety are specifically
1 53
rejected as grounds to justify exclusion.
One court applying the FHA in the zoning context emphasized the
point by observing that, "because of their special needs, handicapped
persons are often denied equal opportunities when they are treated like
all other non-handicapped persons."'54 While it is certainly conceivable
that an insurer would refuse to underwrite a home and/or cancel a policy

151. Courts have often cautioned against automatically applying rules involving race
discrimination to the disability context. See, e.g., Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1339 n.13 (9th
Cir. 1990) (noting that disability cases present "novel legal issues"); Howard v. City of
Beavercreek, 108 F. Supp. 2d 866, 872 n.l (S.D. Ohio 2000) (stating that the application of
"employment" standards to FHA disability discrimination cases "is an imperfect fit"); Fink v.
Kitzman, 881 F.'Supp. 1347, 1368-69 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 206
(D.N.H. 1981) ("[Alttempting to fit the problem of [disability] discrimination against the
handicapped into the model remedy for race discrimination is akin to fitting a square peg into a
round hole.").
152. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985) (interpreting Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 701-97 (2000)).
153. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179
(citation omitted).
154. Parish of Jefferson v. Allied Health Care, Inc., Nos. 91-1199, 1200, 3959, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9124, at *19 (E.D. La. June 10, 1992).
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because the occupants possessed disabilities, such circumstances are
probably rare.
Courts should therefore be especially hesitant to apply an "animus"
standard for an FHA case alleging intentional disability discrimination.'
In applying other disability discrimination statutes-namely, the
Americans with Disabilities Act" 6 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,"7
("Rehabilitation Act")-courts have generally accepted a "deliberate
indifference" standard rather than an "animus" standard for intentional
discrimination. In particular, under these federal anti-discrimination
statutes, intentional discrimination is established when the defendant
acts with a "deliberate indifference to the strong likelihood that pursuit
of its questioned policies will likely result in a violation of federally
protected rights."'58
The legislative history of the FHAA states that the same standards
as were developed under the Rehabilitation Act are to be used in FHA
disability discrimination claims.15 9 Therefore,
the "deliberate
indifference," rather than "animus," standard should be alleged in
support of an FHA disability discrimination claim. The distinction may
be crucial in FHA/insurance cases, because the "animus" standard is
more difficult to meet than the "deliberate indifference" standard.
Group homes illustrate the difference between the standards.
Suppose an Oxford House rents a home to a group of unrelated adults in
recovery from substance abuse. The Oxford House applies for
homeowner's insurance and is told that the home does not qualify for a

155. At the very least, as with race, the "animus" standard in FHA disability discrimination
does not require an "evil motive"-it only requires disparate treatment. See, e.g., Horizon House
Developmental Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683, 696 (E.D. Pa.
1992). But see Smith & Lee Assocs. Inc. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 794 (dicta suggesting that
animus is required in FHA disability discrimination case).
156. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101213).
157. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-97.
158. Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1999); accord Bartlett
v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 331 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated on other
grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999); Bravin v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 58 F. Supp. 2d 269, 273
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Proctor v. Prince George's Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp. 2d 820, 828 (D. Md. 1998);
Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 931 F. Supp. 2d 688, 697 (D. Ariz. 1996), aff'd and remanded, 157
F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1998).
159. Congress stated that it intended to use the "same definitions and concepts" of the
Rehabilitation Act when it extended the FHA's protections to persons with disabilities. See H.R.
REP. No. 100-711, at 17 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2178; see also Howard v.
City of Beavercreek, 108 F. Supp. 2d 866, 872 n.1(S.D. Ohio 2000) (stating that standards for
discrimination in FHAA handicap discrimination cases are to follow the Rehabilitation Act of
1973).
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homeowner's policy because it is considered a "boarding" house.
Although, for the people who live there, an Oxford House or other group
home is like a family,'60 the insurer nonetheless invokes an exclusion for
dwellings with the "no more than five roomers or boarders" rule as a
basis for denying homeowner's insurance. As a factual matter, residents
of Oxford
Houses are not "roomers or boarders" in the usual sense of the
16
term.

1

Under the "animus" standard, there is no FHA violation, because
the insurer never took the tenants' disabilities into account when
160. See infra note 161.
161. Courts have held that the question of whether or not a home is sufficiently akin to a family
setting to qualify for a policy is a question of fact. See, e.g., Group House v. Bd. of Zoning, 380
N.E.2d 207, 211 (N.Y. 1978); accord Cherry Hill Township v. Oxford House, Inc., 621 A.2d 952,
962 (N.J. App. 1993) (finding that an Oxford House was substantially different from a halfway
house facility). Generally speaking, the simple definitions are as follows: roomers rent rooms;
boarders rent rooms and meals; tenants rent an entire house. In all Oxford Houses, the
residents/tenants rent the use of the entire house, and not individual rooms or any meals. Thus,
under usual underwriting criteria, these occupants must be viewed as "tenants," and not as "roomers
or boarders." Courts have ruled, on point, that residents of an Oxford House are not "roomers or
boarders," and that an Oxford House is not a "rooming" or "boarding" house. As one federal court
explained in describing an Oxford House:
The residents share more than "household responsibilities" and meals. The residents
make all house decisions in a democratic fashion. But even more importantly, the
support they lend each othe'r is therapeutic, in the same manner as that of a wellfunctioning family. The relationship between the resident-plaintiffs herein is not
analogous to that between residents of a boarding house.
Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1335 (D.N.J 1991). Another
district court similarly found:
Oxford Houses are not health care facilities, rehabilitation centers, or supervised halfway
houses. They are simply residential dwellings rented by a group of individuals who are
recovering from alcoholism and drug addiction .... Unlike a boarding house, where a
proprietor is responsible to run and operate the premises, at Oxford House, the residents
are responsible for their own food and care as well as for running the home. Because the
house must be self-supporting, each of the residents needs a source of income to pay his
or her fair share of the expenses.
Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 452 (D.N.J. 1992); see also
Tsombanidis v. City of W. Haven, 180 F. Supp. 2d 262, 284 (D. Conn. 2001) (rejecting city's
position that Oxford House was a "boarding house"); Martin v. Constance, 843 F. Supp. 1321, 1325
(E.D. Mo. 1994) ("The group home would be more closely akin to a family residence, than a
business or boarding house with transient occupants."); United States v. Borough of Audubon, 797
F. Supp. 353, 355 (D.N.J. 1991) ("Oxford Houses are not health care facilities, rehabilitation
centers, or supervised halfway houses," but rather "are simply residential dwellings that are rented
by a group of individuals who are recovering from alcoholism or drug addiction."); Cherry Hill
Township, 621 A.2d at 962 (stating that Oxford Houses resemble "ordinary residences").
Lest there be any doubt as to whether Oxford House residents are "roomers" or "tenants,"
courts should keep in mind that the terms are usually not defined in homeowners' policies, and it is
an elementary principle of insurance law that all ambiguous terms of a policy must be construed in
favor of the insured. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 372 F.2d 256, 258 (9th
Cir. 1967).
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denying coverage. However, under the "deliberate indifference"
standard for intentional discrimination, an insurer would almost certainly
be liable under the FHA if it acts adversely upon an insured's application
on the basis that the group home is a "boarding house," rather than a
family situation, where the facts do not support the insurer's application
of a "roomers or boarders" rule.'62 Indeed, a defendant is liable under the
"deliberate indifference" standard even when its belief that it has not
violated the federal
disability anti-discrimination statutes is a
"miscalculation." 163
It may be argued that applying anything other than an "animus"
standard for intentional discrimination in disability FHA cases would
conflate an intentional discrimination claim with a "reasonable
accommodation" claim. After all, the "deliberate indifference" standard
is tantamount to alleging that the defendant simply ignored the disabled
plaintiffs request for an accommodation. At least one court has adopted
this reasoning, holding that a "failure to reasonably accommodate"
theory cannot support an intentional discrimination claim under the
FHA.'64
Nevertheless, the FHAA's legislative history is clear that the
standards for discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act are to be used
in FHA cases. Until courts definitively resolve the issue, insurers should
be aware that refusing to underwrite a home because a plaintiffs
disability prevents him from satisfying an underwriting rule could
constitute intentional discrimination under a "deliberate indifference"
theory.
2. Indirect Evidence
Courts have acknowledged that FHA defendants are unlikely to
admit openly that they discriminated on the basis of race (or any
protected status for that matter).' 65 After all, only a foolhardy insurer
162. The above argument will fail if it cannot be shown that the residents with disabilities are,
in fact, living in a family situation. If, for example, the residents in question are living in what is
essentially a traditional nursing facility, there seems little doubt that the "no more than five roomers
or boarders" rule would apply.
163. See Procter v. Prince George's Hospital Ctr., 32 F. Supp. 2d 820, 829 (D. Md. 1998)
(citation omitted); Davis v. Flexman, 109 F. Supp. 2d. 776, 791 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (stating that
defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiff when he "had not read" the law and
"continued to insist that the law did not require him to provide" an accommodation for the plaintiff).
164. See Schanz v. Vill. Apts., 998 F. Supp. 784, 789 (E.D. Mich. 1998):
165. See, e.g., United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 783 (N.D. Miss.
1972) ("The Court recognizes that 'most persons will not admit publicly that they entertain any bias
or prejudice against members of the Negro Race."') (quotation omitted). More recent decisions also
are cognizant of the fact that explicit discriminatory intent is exceptionally difficult to prove. See
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would acknowledge today that it refused to underwrite a home because
of the applicant's protected status,'66 and it is admittedly rare that an
FHA plaintiff
can produce such direct evidence of discrimination against
67
an insurer.'
For this reason, courts have allowed FHA plaintiffs to prove cases
of intentional discrimination through indirect or circumstantial means
rather than explicit direct proof. In particular, FHA plaintiffs can also
demonstrate intentional discrimination through use of the "burdenshifting" method set forth in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green. 68 A
prima facie housing discrimination case is shown when the plaintiff
proves: (1) that he or she is a member of a racial minority, (2) that he or
she applied for and was qualified to rent or purchase certain property or
housing, (3) that he or she was rejected and/or treated differently, and
(4) that the housing or rental property remained available thereafter.'6 9
Most times, the prima facie case will not be difficult for the plaintiff to
prove against an insurer.
The defendant, in turn, must show some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the disparate treatment. 70 In response, the
plaintiff must show that the proffered reason is a pretext that masks
discrimination. '' Whether the purported nondiscriminatory reason for
the disparate treatment is a pretext is a factual issue for the court.7

Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 97 F. Supp. 2d 602, 612 (D.N.J. 2000) ("[lt is unusual that a [FHA
defendant] will openly reveal that he or she acted on the basis of discriminatory intent.") (quotation
omitted).
166. Such has been known to happen. In the American Family case, for example, a sales
manager instructed an agent in a tape-recorded conversation, "You write too many blacks .... You
got to write good, solid, premium-paying white people." Squires et al., The Unavailability of
Information on Insurance Unavailability: Insurance Redlining and the Absence of Geocoded
Disclosure Data, HOUS. POLICY DEBATE 347, at 350 (2001) (citation omitted) (available at
http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd-1202-squires.pdf).
167. See SCHWEMM, supra note 17, at § 10:2 ("Most modem Title VIII cases have had to rely
heavily, if not exclusively, on circumstantial evidence for proof of the defendant's discriminatory
motive."). Of course, "a fair housing plaintiff is always well advised to produce proof of intentional
discrimination if he can." Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and The Fair Housing Act,
54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 199, 205 (1978).
168. 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (setting forth burden of proof in Title VII cases). See, e.g., Selden
Apts. v. HUD, 785 F.2d 152, 159 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying burden-shifting method to FHA case);
SCHWEMM, supra note 17, § 10:2 n.25 (citing decisions from nearly every circuit applying
McDonnell-Douglas test in FHA cases). Of course, if a plaintiff is able to demonstrate direct
intentional discrimination under the FHA, the "burden shifting" test is unnecessary. See, e.g.,
Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1500 n. 16 (10th Cir. 1995).
169. See Selden, 785 F.2d at 159; SCHWEMM, supra note 17, § 10:2.
170. See, e.g., Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1993).
171. See Selden, 785 F.2d at 160.
172. See Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of Olathe, 248 F.3d 1267, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol31/iss1/5

32

Stanton: The Fair Housing Act and Insurance: An Update and the Question of

20021

THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND INSURANCE

To date, the author is aware of only one court that has applied the
McDonnell-Douglastest in an FHA insurance case.'73 By adjusting the
McDonnell-Douglasfactors to fit the insurance context,'74 the plaintiffs
must show: (1) that they belong to a protected class; (2) that they applied
for and were eligible for housing-related insurance that was available;
(3) that the plaintiffs' insurance application was rejected; and (4) that the
housing-related insurance remained available after the rejection."'
It bears emphasis that the legitimate reason must exist at the time of
the disparate treatment; a post hoc rationalization of the discriminatory
conduct will not suffice.1 6 For example, suppose a home owned by an
African-American family is more than fifty years old, and the potential
policy contains an exclusion for homes over fifty years old. When the
family applies for property insurance, the agent asks several questions in
processing the application, but does not ask the age of the home. The
agent denies the application. When the family/applicants sue, the insurer
cannot defend on the grounds that the home would not have been

covered anyway.177
Presumably, the key question would be whether or not the plaintiffs
were "qualified" for the insurance in question. Take, for example, the
dispute described above as to whether Oxford House residents are living
in a family situation, or classified as "roomers or boarders." Defendant
insurers will contend that the plaintiffs either didn't make out a prima
facie case, or alternatively, that the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for the rejection of the application was because the plaintiffs were not
qualified for the insurance product.
173. See Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Farmers Ins. Group, Nos. C199-1339 & CIOO-2981, at 13-15
(Ohio C.P. Mar. 29, 2001) (unpublished opinion on file with author) (allowing race discrimination
redlining claim brought under state fair housing laws to proceed).
174. Professor Schwemm cites many FHA cases that have applied the McDonnell-Douglas
factors. Most often, the scenario involves a landlord denying an apartment to a prospective renter.
See SCHWEMM, supra note 17, § 10:2 n.25 (collecting cases).
175. See, e.g., Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr., Nos. C199-1339 & CI00-2981, at 14.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Grooms, 348 F. Supp. 1130, 1133 (M.D. Fla. 1972); cf
Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers Int'l Union, 778 F. Supp. 1401, 1419 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (finding
that in Title VII case "[p]ost hoc rationalizations [for discriminatory conduct], however persuasive,
will not suffice").
177. See Grooms, 348 F. Supp. at 1133. The insurer could, in appropriate circumstances, seek
to void the policy on the grounds that the insured committed a material misrepresentation in not
disclosing or misrepresenting the age of his house. Some states explicitly place the burden on the
insurer to demonstrate such a misrepresentation. See, e.g., Parsaie v. United Olympic Life Ins. Co.,
29 F.3d 219, 220 (5th Cir. 1994); Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co. v. Walsh, 590 A.2d 957, 964
(Conn. 1991); Fuller v. Dir. of Fin., 694 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Utah 1985). However, such an age
restriction could still be vulnerable to a FHA charge based on disparate impact. See infra notes 17879 and accompanying text.
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Even if the court ultimately decides that an eligibility rule against
five "roomers or boarders" is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
denying a group home's insurance application, the reason may be
deemed "pretextual." If, for instance, the defendant insurer has made
exceptions with other applications for dwellings consisting of five or
more unrelated adults living together (for example, college students
renting a house), the defendant insurer would potentially be liable under
the FHA if it decides to strictly enforce the rule when presented with a
group home's application for homeowner's insurance. 8 Evidence that
the defendant insurer has made exceptions to other underwriting rules
could also support a claim that the invocation of the "roomers or
boarders" rule is pretextual, and that the insurer simply does not want to
underwrite a home for people with disabilities.
B. DisparateImpact
Under a disparate impact theory, a facially neutral policy may
violate the FHA if it has a disproportionate effect on members of a
protected class. Although there is nothing in the FHA's statutory
language or legislative history discussing the disparate impact theory,'79
virtually every jurisdiction has held that the "disparate impact"
discrimination analysis is appropriate in FHA cases.'80 As one court
178. Cf Tsombanidis v. City of W. Haven, 180 F. Supp. 2d 262, 278 (D. Conn. 2001) (noting
that zoning commissioner had never inspected for alleged "boarding house" violation or enforced
prohibition in eleven and a half years).
179. As Professor Schwemm explained: "Intentional discrimination was a way of life in the
real estate business, and it was to this situation that the proponents of the Fair Housing Act
primarily addressed themselves." Schwemm, supra note 167, at 209.
180. To date, every circuit except the District of Columbia Circuit (which has not spoken on
the issue) has held that the disparate impact theory is actionable under the FHA. See, e.g., Simms v.
First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996); Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v.
HUD, 56 F.3d 1243, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 1995); Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531, 1543
( lIth Cir. 1994); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 988 F.2d 252, 269 n.20 (lst Cir.
1993); United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1988); Keith v. Volpe,
858 F.2d 467, 482-84 (9th Cir. 1988); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986);
Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mitchell, 580
F.2d 789, 791-92 (5th Cir. 1978); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147-48 (3d Cir.
1977); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Viii. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977);
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974). Among other
jurisdictions, see, e.g., Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46,
58-60 (D.D.C. 2002) (applying disparate impact to FHA/insurance case); Samaritan Inns v. District
of Columbia, 93 CV 2600, 1995 WL 405710 (D.D.C. June 30, 1995) (approving a disparate impact
claim), affd in part and rev'd in part (approving on other grounds), 114 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir.
1997); In re Township of Warren, 622 A.2d 1257, 1267 (N.J. 1993) (approving on other grounds
and collecting numerous cases); HUD v. Ross, Fair Hous.-Fair Lend. Rptr., 25,075 (HUD ALJ
1994); HUD v. Carter, Fair Hous.-Fair Lend. Rptr., T 25,029 (HUD ALI 1992).
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explained, "'the necessary premise of the disparate impact approach is
that some [housing] practices, adopted without a deliberately
discriminatory motive, may
' ''8in operation be functionally equivalent to
intentional discrimination. 1 1
1. Insurance Practices That Are Vulnerable to an FHA/Disparate
Impact Claim
a. In Race Discrimination Cases
Underwriting rules in insurance policies that can have a disparate
impact on protected classes include the setting of minimum value (i.e.,
refusing to insure dwellings valued at less than $50,000) or maximum
age requirements (i.e., refusing to insure dwellings at least thirty years
old) for homes eligible for coverage.'82 Such rules tend to
disproportionately affect racial minorities and prevent people in such
homes from obtaining adequate insurance. The point was illustrated as
follows:
Homes valued at less than $50,000 or built before 1950 often do not
qualify for insurance, or only qualify for limited policies like basic fire
or market value policies rather than full replacement cost policies.
These practices have a clear adverse impact on racial minorities
In June 2002, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye
Community Hope Foundation, No. 01-1269, 70 U.S.L.W. 3788 (June 24, 2002). Among other
questions presented, the Court will consider "In light of constitutional freedom of political
expression, can [a] disparate impact claim under [the] Fair Housing Act be maintained against [a]
municipal corporation for alleged impact of filing of facially neutral and judicially upheld
referendum petition?" Id. In Buckeye Community Hope, the plaintiffs introduced comments made by
neighborhood residents who opposed the establishment of an affordable housing complex at a city
council meeting as evidence of discrimination. See Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found. v. City of
Cuyahoga Falls, 263 F.3d 627, 640-41 (6th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court's decision was not
available at the time this article went to press, but it is possible that the Court will speak on the
application of disparate impact claims in FHA cases.
181. Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1250-51 (quotation and parenthetical omitted);
182. In a lawsuit filed against Travelers and Aetna in the District of Columbia, it was alleged
that the age restrictions shut out 61% of the homes in minority neighborhoods, but only 23% in
largely white areas. See Bill Miller, Insurer Faces Lawsuit Claiming D.C. Bias, WASH. POST, June
27, 2000, at B3. The suit also alleged that the minimum value requirements shut out 94% of homes
in predominately minority neighborhoods, but only 23% of homes in largely white areas. See id.
It should be noted that a dwelling's minimum value for underwriting purposes is typically
described as $40,000 or $50,000. See Jim Gallagher, Allstate Insists It's Changing, Critics Say
Insurer Unfair to Urban Poor, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 17, 1996, at 3C. The article notes
that a 30-year underwriting age restriction would prevent coverage to 69 percent of urban Missouri
homes, and 90% of minority-owned homes. See id. Likewise, a company with a $50,000 minimum
value for a dwelling would exclude 80% of the state's minority homeowners and two thirds of rural
homes. See id.
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because among owner-occupants in single family dwellings, Black
households are more than twice as likely as white households ... to
reside in homes that are valued at less than $ 50,000. Similarly, 40
percent of black households but only 29 percent of white households
live in homes that were built prior to 1950."'

Other underwriting mechanisms that potentially limit coverage for
homes in predominately minority neighborhoods may exist. For
example, refusals to underwrite homes that contain lead paint would
obviously affect only older homes, and should not be treated any
differently from maximum age restrictions for FHA purposes if such
rules tend to limit coverage for homes in predominately minority
neighborhoods. Defense lawyers for insurers and lenders have likewise
cautioned that the use of credit scores and credit histories could
potentially violate the FHA for the same reasons.'8 4 Insurers have also
reached settlement agreements precluding the insurers from limiting
coverage of a dwelling because of an adjacent property or property in the
surrounding neighborhood, unless that property was shown to pose a
specific hazard to the dwelling seeking coverage.'85
Furthermore, insurance companies often refuse to provide coverage
sufficient to replace a home if the cost of replacement exceeds the
market value of the home by a certain percentage.'

Such underwriting

criteria could have a disparate impact on racial minorities. In support of
these underwriting practices, insurers claim that covering a home for
more than its market value creates an incentive to destroy the home (i.e.,
"moral hazard").'87 Because housing prices in older, minority
neighborhoods are likely to be low relative to replacement cost, the
183. Hearing on Homeowners' Insurance Discrimination Before the Senate Comm. On
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 51. (1994) (statement of Roberta Achtenberg,
Assistant Secretary, Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.) [hereinafter Hearingon Homeowners Insurance
Discrimination];see also Badain, supra note 4, at 13-15 (contending dwelling maximum age
underwriting restrictions are unlawful); Squires, supra note 3, at 496 & n.43 (citing study
demonstrating disparate impact on minority communities as a result of maximum age and minimum
value underwriting guidelines). Even defense lawyers for lenders and insurers have conceded that
"underwriting criteria that are based solely and directly on the age of a dwelling or its market value
may subject an insurer to unwanted scrutiny." SANDLER ET AL., supra note 4, § 2.02[4][b], at 2-30.
These lawyers counsel insurers instead to base underwriting criteria on more specific criteria, such
as "condition of the roof, heating, wiring or plumbing systems of a house." Id.
184. See SANDLER ET AL., supra note 4, § 2.02[4][b][ii], at 2-31; cf Nat'l FairHous. Alliance,
208 F. Supp. 2d at 48 (stating that FHA plaintiffs alleged that defendants improperly used "factors
such as credit history to determine eligibility for homeowners insurance").
185. See SANDLER ET AL., supra note 4, § 2.02[4][bl[iii], at 2-31 (quoting Nationwide and
American Family consent decrees).
186. See Badain, supra note 4, at 13-14.
187. See id. at 14.
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unavailability of mortgage and insurance in such neighborhoods
depresses home values still further, resulting in a downward spiral that
can devastate vast expanses of urban landscape, rendering the housing
there unavailable to anyone. Fair housing advocates have argued that
such guidelines are based on stereotypes and not on actuarial
experience.' 88
b. In Disability Discrimination Cases
Similar rules may befall persons with disabilities. Insurers might
refuse to provide a homeowner's policy to a dwelling that houses more
than five unrelated adults. Insurers reason that, if there are more than
five unrelated adults, the house is considered a "boarding" house, that is,
a commercial enterprise (and, thus, a higher insurance risk than an
ordinary home).
The "no more than five unrelated adults" rule has a manifest
discriminatory effect on "group homes" for people with disabilities.
Again, taking Oxford Houses as an example, it is extremely commonif not the norm-for group homes to have more than five unrelated
adults. Indeed, when Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
it required states wishing to receive federal block grant funds for the
prevention and treatment of substance abuse to establish or assist in
establishing group homes comprised of groups of no fewer than six
individuals for recovering alcoholics and drug abusers.'89 Courts have
specifically recognized that group homes such as Oxford Houses require
more than five people in order to provide an optimally appropriate
environment for recovery. '9°
But a rule limiting covered dwellings to no more than five roomers
might make it financially impossible to run an Oxford House.'9 '
188. See, e.g., id. at 13-15. One also wonders just how strong the "moral hazard" arguments are
grounded into reality. For example, it cannot be disputed that most people have a strong emotional
attachment to their homes. As one of the plaintiffs from the American Family case put it, "Some
insurance companies say, 'They'll just bum down their houses to get the insurance,' Listenbee said.
'That really angers me. Your house is the biggest investment you'll ever make. Why would you
want to bum it down?' Norman, supra note 59, at 12.
189. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300x-21,25(1994).
190. See, e.g., Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1331 (D.N.J.
1991).
191. See, e.g., Tsombanidis v. City of W. Haven, 180 F. Supp. 2d 262, 290 (D. Conn. 2001)
(finding that Oxford Houses could not be run with "three or less residents" and that at least six
residents were necessary to provide supportive environment necessary for residents' recovery);
Groome Res., Ltd., v. Parish of Jefferson, 52 F. Supp. 2d 721, 724 (E.D. La. 1999) ("trial evidence
convinces the Court that the artificial limit of four unrelated persons living in a single group home
will make it economically unfeasible for plaintiff to operate the [group] home"); ReMed Recovery
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Application of the "no more than five unrelated adults" rule forces
owners of such homes to purchase "commercial" insurance-which
often provides less coverage than a homeowners' policy-at a higher
cost. In contrast, "no more than five unrelated adults" rules have a far
less significant impact on those who are not otherwise disabled. Such
people have many housing choices and alternatives, and the impact of
their having to choose among housing alternatives is minimal compared
to that for persons with disabilities.
2. Disparate Impact as Cognizable in FHA/Insurance Cases
Many insurers adamantly insist that "disparate impact" is not
actionable in the fair housing/insurance context. Insurers contend that
their compliance with state insurance regulations proves that their
underwriting standards are fair. In addition, insurers argue that increased
cost and decreased availability of homeowners' insurance accurately
reflects the increased risk of marketing insurance in urban communities
or to a group of unrelated individuals. As the Seventh Circuit put it in
American Family, "[r]isk discrimination is not race discrimination."'92
Insurers also rely upon the Sixth Circuit's decision in Nationwide, which
noted that HUD (for reasons not explained in the opinion) opted not to
argue for the disparate impact theory in the case.' 93 Furthermore, some
courts and commentators have suggested that it is inherently unfair for
private defendants to be subjected to a disparate impact analysis in fair
housing cases, reasoning that private defendants (unlike government
entities) cannot be expected to consider how their decisions could
disproportionately impact the entire community.' 94 Insurers bolster this
Care Ctrs. v. Township of Williston, 36 F. Supp. 2d 676, 686 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding evidence that
group home could not be operated with only five residents).
192. NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1992).
193. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1362 (6th Cir. 1995).
194. See Vill.
of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1533 (7th Cir. 1990) ("It is one thing to
require a municipal government to consider the impact of its zoning decisions on the racial
composition of the municipality, another to require an individual broker to consider and take steps
to prevent the aggregate impact of many brokers' efforts to give individual customers what those
customers want individually, though not collectively."); Brown v. Artery Org., Inc., 654 F. Supp.
1106, 1115-16 (D.D.C. 1987) (expressing similar sentiments and refusing to impose disparate
impact liability on private defendant absent a showing of discriminatory intent); Peter E. Mahoney,
The End(s) of DisparateImpact: DoctrinalReconstruction, FairHousing and Lending Law, and the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 449-50 (1998) (suggesting that the disparate
impact doctrine currently applied to public defendants under Title VIII cannot sensibly be applied to
private defendants); Detlefsen, supra note 4, at 36 (arguing that applying disparate impact liability
to insurance is unfair, but conceding that HUD recognizes the theory); see also Squires, supra note
3, at 499 (advocating "disparate impact" theory in FHA/insurance cases, but acknowledging that at
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179

contention by lamenting that HUD has failed to provide guidelines as to
what constitutes permissible underwriting, and what does not, for FHA
195
purposes.
Facial attacks against application of the disparate impact theory
against an insurer in a fair housing case should fail. First, every federal
jurisdiction has approved a disparate impact theory of liability in FHA
suits brought in contexts other than insurance. 196 There is absolutely
nothing in the statutory language or legislative history of the FHA that
could plausibly support an argument exempting insurers from disparate
impact claims. There was no such special insurance exemption when
Congress enacted the FHA in 1968, nor when Congress extended the
FHA's protections to more classes through the amendments in 1974 or
1988. If Congress had wished to exempt the insurance industry from
disparate impact claims brought under the FHA, it undoubtedly would
have said so."'
Second, arguments that it is inherently unfair for a private
defendant to be expected to be aware of the discriminatory effects its
practices may have on protected classes are not convincing. Any such
distinction between private defendants and governmental entities cannot
be found in the FHA's language or legislative history. 98 Indeed,
regardless of the views of certain courts and commentators, ' " most
the time of writing, it was unclear whether courts would accept theory); Murray, supra note 3, at
742-46 (stating virtually the same).
195. This type of argument first appeared in the Ninth Circuit's decision in Pfaff v. HUD, 88
F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1996). In Pfaff, private landlords (a retired couple in their 70s) were sued under
the FHA after they refused to rent to prospective tenants because their family had five members, and
the landlords had an occupancy limit of four tenants. See id. at 742-43. The house in question was
apparently "very small." See id. at 749. HUD agreed with the plaintiffs that the four-person
occupancy limit had a disparate impact on the basis of familial status, and thus violated the FHA.
See id. at 743-45. Among other reasons for reversing HUD's decision, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that HUD had failed to give any guidelines as to how "landlords like the Pfaffs" could determine
just how they could enforce occupancy limitations without running afoul of the FHA. See id. at 749.
196. See cases cited supra note 180.
197. Congress has demonstrated that it knows how to create exemptions from the reach of the
FHA. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1994) (excluding current drug users); Id. § 3602: Transvestism
(excluding transvestites); Id. § 3607(a) (excluding religious organizations); Id. § 3607(b) (excluding
housing for older persons).
198. See Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 59 n.7
(D.D.C. 2002) (noting that any distinction between governmental and nongovernmental bodies for
disparate impact purposes "finds no support in the language of the [FHA] or in the legislative
history"); see also supra note 43 for cases holding "all practices which have the effect of denying
dwellings on prohibited grounds are therefore unlawful" under the FHA.
199. See supra note 194. Some commentators have criticized the view that it is unfair to apply
disparate impact theory to private defendants in FHA cases, charging that such a view "disregards
the private defendant's role in the development of the policy or practice in question, and [its] power
to modify for a less discriminatory result." Phyliss Craig-Taylor, To Be Free: Liberty, Citizenship,
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circuits have held that the FHA disparate impact theory is applicable to
private defendants."
Third, virtually the same argument can be made when a person with
a disability requests a reasonable accommodation from an insurer under
the FHA. In fact, the Seventh Circuit observed that reasonable
accommodations and disparate impact "for all practical purposes [are]
the same thing."2 °' Surely it is beyond question that reasonable
accommodation FHA claims apply to private defendants.
Fourth, insurers cannot legitimately take comfort in the Pfaff
opinion, which sharply criticized HUD for not promulgating guidance as
to what sort of occupational limits would be permissible under the
FHA. °2 Unlike the retired couple in Pfaff who rented a single house,
insurers are sophisticated business entities fully capable of determining
whether particular occupancy rules and/or dwelling age limits will or
will not result in business hardships.0 3 If courts apply disparate impact
liability under the FHA against mortgage lenders,2°4 then surely the same
must be true for insurance defendants. In addition, while HUD
guidelines delineating exactly how insurers could avoid disparate impact
claims might be helpful,05 a large part of the blame for HUD's failure to
promulgate such regulations falls upon the insurance industry itself. The
insurance industry has lobbied against HUD taking any such action,
stubbornly insisting that the FHA does not apply to insurance

Property, and Race, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 45, 79 (1998). The National Fair Housing
Alliance court agreed with this reasoning. See Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 59,
(rejecting argument that disparate impact can never apply to private defendant because a large
insurer "clearly has control over the practices and policies at issue here").
200. See, e.g., Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that
an FHA plaintiff can show discriminatory effect when defendant's "policy, procedure, or practice
specifically identified by the plaintiff has a significantly greater discriminatory impact on members
of a protected class"); Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec. of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243, 1250-52
(10th Cir. 1995) (analyzing disparate impact claim in familial status discrimination case against
private defendant); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 986-89 (4th Cir. 1984) (same);
Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2d Cir. 1979) (applying disparate impact
analysis in racial discrimination case against private defendant); United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d
789, 791 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying disparate impact as a way to prove unlawful steering where
evidence suggested an apartment owner confined blacks to a specific area of the complex);
Williams v. The Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir. 1974) (same).
201. Hemisphere Bldg. Co. v. Vill. of Richton Park, 171 F.3d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1999).
202. See Pfaffv. HUD, 88 F.3d 739, 749 (9th Cir. 1996).
203. See supra note 199 for authority and commentators following this view.
204. See, e.g., Old W. End Ass'n v. Buckeye Fed. Sav. & Loan, 675 F. Supp. 1100, 1105-06
(N.D. Ohio 1987).
205. See generally Squires, supra note 3 (urging HUD to promulgate regulations to clarify
FHA's application to property insurance).
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(notwithstanding numerous judicial decisions to the contrary).2 6 For
insurers to argue that they have no guidance from the federal
government while opposing promulgation of such regulations that would
provide guidance is as unpersuasive as a patricide defendant's begging
for judicial leniency because he is an orphan.
Fifth, even though HUD declined to pursue a disparate impact
theory against the defendant insurer in the Nationwide case, °7 HUD has
since taken the position that it will apply disparate impact liability to
insurance/fair housing cases. 0 8 At congressional hearings on the subject
of insurance discrimination, HUD's Assistant Secretary testified that
"[t]he standards to determine discrimination [in insurance-]as in all
other covered areas-will be based on the principles of overt

206. The insurance industry's efforts to avoid FHA application to underwriting practices have
been consistent and widespread. In 1980, attempts were made to amend the FHA to make the law
specifically applicable to insurance. Many insurance groups opposed the amendment, which was
ultimately unsuccessful. See Badain, supra note 4, at 44-45 & n.248 (noting that several insurance
groups filed statements at hearings opposing inclusion of insurance to FHA). In the mid-1990s, the
insurance industry successfully prevented HUD from promulgating guidelines for property
insurance, as President Clinton had mandated in a 1994 Executive Order. See Kirk M. Herath &
Tammy L. Rader, The Redlining Fire Continues to Burn, BEST'S REv.-PROP. CAS. INS. EDITION,
Feb. 1995, at 62. In 1997, the insurance industry has fought to get HUD's appropriations budget
reduced in hopes of preventing investigations regarding FHA violations against the insurance
industry. See Banham, supra note 11, at 1lA (noting insurance industry's lobbying efforts "to
encourage Congress to cut HUD's appropriations"). These efforts were successful. See HUD to
Lose Money to Investigate Insurers' Redlining, BESTWIRE (July 31, 1998). In 2000, Congress
rejected legislative proposals that would have provided federal reinsurance contracts through the
Treasury Department for state programs covering catastrophic losses on residential properties. The
proposals contained language that would have explicitly prohibited insurance redlining. Insurance
companies lobbied extensively to prevent the anti-redlining provision of H.R. 21 from becoming
law. See Press Release, National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, NAMIC Opposes
Applying Fair Housing Act to Insurance (June 19, 2000) (on file with the author), available at
http://www.namic.org; Financial Services Modernization Legislation Won't Work Without
Preserving State Regulation of Insurance Activities, PR Newswire (Oct. 30, 1997) (quoting
representative of the National Association of Independent Insurers as opposing legislation that
would have recognized FHA's application to insurance). Similarly, a spokeswoman from NAMIC
was quoted as saying "'Right now, HUD believes it is their business to develop regulations [on
insurance] and they cite the Fair Housing Act as the reason why. But we firmly believe that they are
over-reaching their boundaries. There is no reason for HUD to get involved [in FHA enforcement
against insurers]."' David Reich-Hale, NAMIC Targets Grass-Roots Political Action, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER: PROP. & CAS.IRISK & BENEFITS MGMT EDITION, Sept. 27, 1999, at 5 (quoting

Pamela Allen, NAMIC's vice president of federal affairs); see also supra note 11 for various
insurance groups' statements insisting that the FHA does not apply to insurance practices.
207. Much like Congress' decision not to adopt an amendment explicitly mentioning
insurance, HUD's strategy for not pursuing a disparate impact claim in the Nationwide case may
have justification. HUD's inaction therefore has no persuasive value.
208. See Detlefson, supra note 4, at 36.
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discrimination, disparate treatment, and disparate impact."2 °9 Moreover,
in 1994, then-Attorney General Janet Reno reaffirmed the federal
government's commitment to use the disparate impact test.210
Accordingly, the Nationwide decision should be of no comfort for
insurers seeking to avoid a disparate impact analysis. If HUD has not
done so already, there can be little doubt that HUD will apply a disparate
impact analysis in a future FHA/insurance discrimination case.
Finally-and perhaps most importantly-since the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Nationwide, at least six courts have approved a disparate
impact theory in fair housing/insurance cases, and two others resulted in
a consent decree forbidding discriminatory effect.2 ' In 1995, following
the Seventh Circuit's decision in American Family, the parties entered
into a consent decree that required the defendant/insurer to refrain from
discrimination by "intent or effect.",212 The following year, the parties in
Nationwide entered into a similar decree.2 3

209. Hearing on Homeowners InsuranceDiscrimination,supra note 183, at 52. Some insurers
have resigned themselves to the reality that HUD recognizes disparate impact theory in FHA cases.
See, e.g., Detlefsen, supra note 4, at 36 (begrudgingly conceding that HUD recognizes the disparate
impact theory although expressing opinion that application of theory toinsurers is unfair).
210. See Reno Approves "Disparate Impact" for Housing Cases, 4 No. 2 DOJ ALERT 5, 6
(Feb. 7, 1994).
211. See, e.g., Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 63
(D.D.C. 2002); Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., P-H Fair Housing-Fair Lending Reporter, I1 16,120,
16,120.4-.5 (W.D. Mo. 1996).
212. United States v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 90-C-0759, at 4 (E.D. Wis. 1995),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cases/amfam.txt (consent decree). The American Family case
settled for $14.5 million. See id. at 35. The decree also required American Family to terminate its
minimum value restrictions, which were alleged to disparately impact minorities. See SANDLER ET
AL., supra note 4, § 2.02[2][a], at 2-12 (discussing American Family consent decree).
213. The Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cisneros case settled for $13.2 million, and
Nationwide likewise agreed to eliminate age and market value of a home from its underwriting
criteria, See Nationwide Earmarks $20 Million for Housing, BESTWIRE (June 2, 1997); see also
SANDLER FT AL., supra note 4, § 2.02[2][a], at 2-12, 2-13 (discussing Nationwide consent decree).
Other settlements against insurers in FHA cases include Toledo FairHousing Center. v. Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co., 705 N.E.2d 1,3 (Ohio C.P. 1998) (approving settlement agreement calling
for establishment of Claim Fund and awarding almost $1.9 million in attorneys' fees and costs in a
fair housing/insurance discrimination case). Nationwide also agreed to invest $3.5 million into city
neighborhoods as a result of the Toledo Fair Housing Center lawsuit as well as $500,000 in
Lexington, Kentucky, and Cincinnati, Ohio, respectively in similar lawsuits. See Jennifer Scott, Jury
Orders Nationwide to Pay in Bias Lawsuit, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 27, 1998, at IA. In April
2000, Nationwide settled an FHA redlining case brought in Richmond, Virginia, alleging systematic
racial discrimination for $17.5 million following a jury verdict of $100 million. See Amanda Levin,
Nationwide Settles Virginia Redlining Suit, NAT'L UNDERWRITER: PROP. & CAS.IRISK & BENEFITS
MGMT. EDITION, May 1, 2000, at 2. In 1999, Liberty Mutual agreed to pay $18 million to the
National Fair Housing Alliance and three fair housing groups to settle discrimination charges. See
Miller, supra note 182.
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The first case resulting in a judicial opinion that endorsed the
disparate impact theory in an FHA case against an insurer was Canady v.
Allstate Insurance Company.24 Canady involved allegations nearly
identical to those in Dunn and American Family, contending that
insurers in Missouri were refusing to underwrite homes fairly in
predominately minority neighborhoods. 25 Along with allegations of
disparate treatment, the plaintiffs also challenged the defendants' use of
"age" and "location" of a home in their underwriting criteria, contending
that use of such facially neutral factors resulted in a disparate impact on
minorities.2 6 The defendants countered that allowing a disparate impact
theory to proceed would "directly contradict" state insurance regulations
that explicitly allowed the use of such criteria "as long as such criteria
are either used for a business purpose and not as a pretext for
discrimination., 271 The Canady court rejected the defendants' arguments,
noting that the American Family and Nationwide courts had themselves
rejected similar arguments from insurers that the FHA would conflict
with state laws. 28
The following year, in Toledo FairHousing Center v. Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co.,2 9 an Ohio state court allowed the plaintiffs to
proceed to trial against an insurer on the disparate impact theory under
Ohio's state fair housing law.220 In Toledo Fair Housing Center, the
plaintiffs alleged that the insurer's minimum dwelling value and
maximum dwelling age underwriting rules had a disparate impact on
homeowners in African-American neighborhoods.221 In support of its
motion for summary judgment, the insurer argued that the disparate
impact theory was inapplicable in the insurance/fair housing context
214. See P-H Fair Housing-Fair Lending Reporter, 16,120, 16,120.4-.5 (W.D. Mo. 1996).
215. See id. 16,120.1.
216. Id. 16,120.5.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. 704 N.E.2d 667 (Ohio C.P. 1997).
220. The plaintiffs in Toledo FairHousing Center based their claim on the Ohio Civil Rights
Act, which contains various housing anti-discrimination provisions that closely resemble the antidiscrimination provisions of the FHA. The Ohio Act makes it illegal (1)to otherwise make housing
unavailable on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, ancestry, handicap, or national
origin or because of the racial composition of the neighborhood in which the housing
accommodations are located; (2) to discriminate in the terms of homeowners insurance on the basis
of handicap; and (3) to refuse to make reasonable accommodations when necessary to allow a
handicapped person equal opportunity to enjoy a dwelling. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4112.02(H)(1), (4), (19) (Anderson 2001). There does not appear to be any reason for which the
Toledo Fair Housing Center's disparate impact analysis would not also be applicable in an FHA
case.
221. See Toledo FairHous. Ctr., 704 N.E.2d at 669 & n.3.
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because, inter alia, such an analysis would "undermine[] the insurance
business. 22" The court rejected this argument, and held that it was
relevant only as a "business necessity" defense, not as
213a frontal attack on
itself.
theory
impact
disparate
the
of
the applicability
3. Burdens of Proof for an FHA Disparate Impact Claim
To establish a prima facie disparate impact case, a plaintiff must
establish that the defendant insurer's practices actually or predictably
had a discriminatory effect on the protected class. In assessing whether
plaintiffs have met this burden, courts have borrowed the disparate
impact test developed in employment litigation. The Ninth Circuit, for
example, has stated that, in order to make a prima facie case under the
FHA, the plaintiff must show "(1) the occurrence of certain outwardly
neutral practices, and (2) a significantly adverse or disproportionate
impact on persons of a particular type produced by the defendant's
facially neutral acts or practices. 224
FHA litigation differs from employment disparate-impact cases in
one regard, however. Unlike in the employment context, courts deciding
FHA cases generally place the burden on the defendant to demonstrate
that no less discriminatory alternatives exist to the disputed housing
practices. In Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo,"' a case involving
allegations of racial discrimination against the City of Philadelphia over
the city's failure to develop low-income housing, the Third Circuit
determined that the defendant should bear the burden of proving a
business necessity, including proof that no less burdensome alternatives
to the disputed practice exist.226 Rizzo noted that it is much easier to
quantify job-related qualities that might bar prospective employees from
222. Id. at 670.
223. See id. at 670-71. There are four remaining decisions, of which the author is aware, that
rejected an insurer's frontal attack of the disparate impact analysis in the fair housing context. See
Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 58-60 (D.D.C.
2002) (rejecting insurer's argument that disparate impact cannot apply to private defendants); Nat'l
Fair Hous. Alliance v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., No. 00-1506 (JR), at 1-2 (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 2001)
(unpublished order on file with author) (allowing disparate impact claim to proceed against FHA
defendant-insurer); Koontz v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., No. C2-98-318 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 21, 2000)
(unpublished opinion on file with author) (denying insurer's motion to dismiss); Toledo Fair Hous.
Ctr. v. Farmers Ins. Group, Nos. C199-1339 & CI00-2981, at 19 (Ohio C.P. Mar. 29, 2001)
(unpublished opinion on file with author) (holding that insurer's underwriting guidelines that
allegedly prevented 93% of homeowners in African-American neighborhoods, but only 61% of
homeowners in white neighborhoods, from obtaining replacement cost coverage stated a disparate
impact claim under state fair housing laws).
224. Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 306 (9th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted).
225. 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977).
226. See id. at 148-49.
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employment than it is to make analogous distinctions in the housing
context. 27 Bluntly stated, "the consequences of an error in admitting a
tenant do not seem nearly as severe as, for example, the consequences of
an error in hiring an unqualified airline pilot. '22' This approach has been
followed by most courts applying the FHA. 29 Accordingly, it is the
insurer-not the plaintiffs-that must demonstrate that there are no
alternatives available to lessen the discriminatory effect of its housing
policies in FHA cases.
Some jurisdictions apply a multi-factor approach in considering
disparate impact claims. These courts balance (1) the strength of the
plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect; (2) evidence of the
defendant's discriminatory intent; (3) the defendant's interest in taking
the challenged action; and (4) whether the plaintiff seeks to compel the
defendant affirmatively to provide housing or merely to refrain from
interfering with others who wish to provide housing. 20 A strong showing
on all four factors is not necessary. 231
One federal judge recently remarked that, because of these
competing standards, "the relevant standards for a disparate impact
' 232
claim under the Fair Housing Act are, at the moment, rather fluid.

227. See id. at 148.
228. Id. at 148-49 (quotation omitted).
229. See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 51 (1st Cir. 2000) (adopting Rizzo
approach); Hemisphere Bldg. Co. v. Viii. of Richton Park, 171 F.3d 437, 440-41 (7th Cir. 1999) ("If
a measure just happens quite without evil purpose to bear more heavily on a protected group than on
other people, the defendant may be required to show that the measure is essential to his business and
the discriminatory effect an unavoidable byproduct."); Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491,
1504-05 (10th Cir. 1995) (following Rizzo); Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington,
844 F.2d 926, 939 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that an FHA defendant must prove "bona fide and
legitimate justifications for its action with no less discriminatory alternatives available"), affd in
part, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Corp. of the Episcopal Church v. W. Valley City, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1215,
1219 (D. Utah 2000) (citing similar language); Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery
County, 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1296 (D. Md. 1993) (same; citing several other cases); Thornton v. City
of Allegan, 863 F. Supp. 504, 510 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (same); Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of
Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1182 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (same); Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of
Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 461 (D.N.J. 1992) (same); Ramos v. Proulx, CA No. 82-0422-F,
1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19030, at *13 (D. Mass. Feb. 29, 1984) (same); United States v. City of
Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981) (same).
230. See Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Keith v. Volpe, 858
F.2d 467, 483 (9th Cir. 1988); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986); Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977).
231. See, e.g., Keith, 858 F.2d at 483.
232. Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81,92 & n.l (2d Cir. 2000) (Moran,
J., dissenting in part) (citing several commentators discussing FHA disparate impact standards),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 888 (2001). Judge Moran's impressive and scholarly compilation on the
development of disparate impact jurisprudence in FHA cases is highly recommended by the author
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Another judge deemed the standards "inchoate" and "increasingly
incoherent. 233 However, as a practical matter, it does not appear that the
two standards of proof differ in any material respects. Both approaches
generally require the plaintiff to demonstrate a discriminatory effect and,
if that is shown, require the defendant to justify its practices. 234 Indeed,
Professor Schwemm has observed that "it is unlikely that these two
'
methods of analysis will produce substantially different results."235
Two aspects of the burden of proof in FHA cases remain unsettled.
Prior to 1989, all courts required the defendant in FHA cases to provide
a "business necessity" for its practices that resulted in discriminatory
effects on members of protected classes.236 In 1989, the Supreme Court's
decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio237 threw disparate impact
jurisprudence into disarray. In Wards Cove, the Court rejected the
traditional "business necessity" test and instead required defendants to
demonstrate a far less burdensome "business justification" to rebut a
prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination.
Two years later, Congress overruled Wards Cove by enacting the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.239 Congress disapproved of the more lenient
"business justifications" test of Wards Cove, and ordered disparate
impact defendants to prove a "business necessity" for their challenged
practices. 240 A degree of uncertainty exists in FHA disparate impact law
because some courts applied the Wards Cove standard to FHA cases
during the 1989-1991 gap.2 Although post-1991 cases seem to be in
for readers wishing to explore the topic in greater detail. See id. at 93-102 (recounting FHA
disparate impact cases).
233. Langlois, 207 F.3d at 52 (Stahl, J., dissenting) (quotation omitted).
234. See, e.g., Keith, 858 F.2d at 484 (rejecting city's attempts to justify its discriminatory
housing practices).
235. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, § 10:7.
236. See, e.g., Hack, 237 F.3d at 93 (Moran, J., dissenting) (retracing development of FHA
burden of proof). The "business justification" test was derived from the standard burden of proof in
Title VII cases. See id. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971)). Courts
generally considered the "business necessity" test to be "strict." See, e.g., Sagers v. Yellow Freight
Sys., Inc., 529 F.2d 721,730 n. 18 (5th Cir. 1976).
237. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
238. See id. at 659.
239. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A) (1994); see Hack, 237 F.3d at 94-95 (Moran, J., dissenting);
Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 486-89 (3d Cir. 1999); Ass'n of MexicanAm. Educators v. California, 937 F. Supp. 1397, 1403-05 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
240. See Hack, 237 F.3d at 94-95 (Moran, J., dissenting); Ass'n of Mexican-Am. Educators,
937 F. Supp. at 1405.
241. See, e.g., Edwards v. Johnston County Health Dep't, 885 F.2d 1215, 1223-24 (4th Cir.
1989); Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp., 724 F. Supp. 148, 154 n.7 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); Miko v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 596 A.2d 396, 402 & n.8 (Conn.
1991). See also SCHWEMM, supra note 17, § 10:5.
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agreement that the "business necessity" test prevails in FHA cases, the
1989-1991 cases have not been disavowed by any court, and counsel
should be aware of these cases.
Second, courts are split as to whether the defendant is required to
show a "compelling" business necessity to justify its practices in order to
rebut a prima facie showing of disparate impact. The Fourth Circuit,
HUD, and several district courts within the Ninth Circuit require that the
defendant's business necessity be "compelling." 243 Courts adopting this
view justify it on the basis that any more lenient standard would
"undermine the protections provided by the [FHA]. '24 The Second and
Third Circuits have applied a substantive equivalent of the "compelling"
test, holding that the defendant must present bona fide and legitimate
justifications for its policy and practice, and must demonstrate that there
are no less discriminatory alternatives available in FHA cases. 2 5
242. See, e.g., Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 704 N.E.2d 667, 673-74 &
n.7 (Ohio C.P. 1997) (collecting authorities); In re Township of Warren, 662 A.2d 1257, 1268 (N.J.
1993) (noting that Wards Cove has no bearing on fair housing cases in light of Civil Rights Act of
1991); HUD v. Mountain Side Mobile Estates, P-H Fair Housing-Fair Lending Reporter, W 25,053,
25,493 (HUD 1993) (refusing to apply Wards Cove in FHA disparate impact case because Congress
had overruled it), rev'd on other grounds, 56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1995).
243. See, e.g., Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1984); Fair Hous.
Cong. v. Weber, 993 F. Supp. 1286, 1292 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (citing U.S. v. M. Westland Co., CV 934141, Fair Housing-Fair Lending 15,941.1 (HUD ALI 1994)); Fair Hous. Council of Orange
County v. Ayres, 855 F. Supp. 315, 318 (C.D. Cal. 1994); United States v. Weiss, 847 F.Supp. 819,
831 (D. Nev. 1994). See also Murray, supra note 3, at 744 ("In order to show business necessity, the
defendant-insurer must show both a compelling need for the allegedly discriminatory policy and the
lack of an alternative policy with a less disproportionate impact.").
244. Ayres, 855 F. Supp. at 318. Although Ayres relied on the statute to justify application of
the "compelling" standard, the "compelling" standard may be limited to discrimination on the basis
of race or religion. Ayres, Betsey, Weber, and Weiss all involved race discrimination. Another case
involving application of the "compelling" standard involved allegations of religious discrimination.
See Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Props., Inc., 876 F. Supp. 1231, 1241-42 (D. Utah 1995),
vacated on other grounds, 98 F.3d 590 (10th Cir. 1996).
Of all the statuses protected by the FHA, only race and religion qualify for strict scrutiny
under an equal protection analysis. In addition, the Supreme Court has held that housing is not a
fundamental right within the meaning of the federal constitution. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56, 79 (1972); but see Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 517 F.2d 918, 919 (2d Cir. 1975) (Oakes, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (suggesting that by passing the FHA, Congress deemed housing
to be a "fundamental right"). Plaintiffs bringing a disparate impact FHA suit on grounds other than
racial or religious discrimination would most likely have to argue that other fundamental rights
(such as the right to association and right to privacy) are implicated in order to require defendants to
demonstrate a heightened "compelling" business necessity. See, e.g., Dubreuil v. W. Winds Mobile
Lodge, 213 Cal. Rptr. 12, 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (Staniforth, J., dissenting) (arguing that
discrimination in housing implicates other fundamental rights; citing numerous commentators
urging same).
245. See Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936 (2d Cir.
1988); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977). The Ayres court
suggested that the Second Circuit's "business necessity" standard is something less than the
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On the other hand, a divided Tenth Circuit panel rejected the
"compelling" standard, partly because the standard had never been
endorsed by the Supreme Court in disparate impact cases. 46 The Tenth
Circuit instead required the necessity to bear a "manifest relationship" to
the defendant's business practices. 47 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Pfaff
also rejected the "compelling" standard when it was applied to the
specific facts of the case before it.24s Rather, the Pfaff panel held that the
defendant could rebut a prima facie disparate impact case by
demonstrating that its proffered necessity was "reasonable."
It is highly unlikely that the lenient standard enunciated in Pfaff
will control future FHA cases. Many aspects of the Ninth Circuit's
decision suggest that it is limited to the facts before it.249 In addition, the

"compelling" test. See Ayres, 855 F. Supp. at 318. However, that seems wrong. At least one other
court has failed to see a distinction between Huntington and the "compelling" test. See CHRO v.
J.E. Ackley, LLC, CV-99550633, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2004, at **9-16 (Conn. Super. July 20,
2001) (equating Huntington with the "compelling" tests of Betsey, Ayres, and Weiss); accord Angel
M. Traub, Comment, The Wall is Down, Now We Build More: The Exclusionary Effects of Gated
Communities Demand Stricter Burdens Under the FHA, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 379, 403 (2000)
(describing Huntington as the "strictest, test for the defendant's burden" in FHA cases).
246. See Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. HUD, 56 F.3d 1243, 1254-55 (10th Cir.
1995). The Mountain Side panel also remarked that the "compelling" standard would be "almost
impossible to satisfy." Id. at 1255. Such an overbroad and wholly unnecessary statement is entirely
unconvincing. Merely because a "compelling" standard is difficult to satisfy is hardly a reason to
discard it in FHA cases. Other defendants have met the standard. See, e.g., Wilson, 876 F. Supp. at
1241-42 (D. Utah 1995) (finding a "compelling" business necessity when landlord would have been
forced out of business if it complied with FHA request), vacated on other grounds, 98 F.3d 590
(10th Cir. 1996); McCauley v. City of Jacksonville, 739 F. Supp. 278, 282 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (finding
a "compelling" business necessity when construction of apartment building would have violated
moratorium on development precipitated by sewage crisis).
247. See Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1255-57 (holding that occupancy limits at mobile home
park had a "manifest relationship" to business necessity because of sewer capacity limitations and
concerns over quality of park life, and therefore did not discriminate under familial status provisions
of FHA). The dissenting judge refused to consider the issue, because he would have found
discrimination even under the "manifest relationship" standard adopted by the majority. See id. at
1258 n.l (Henry, J., dissenting).
248. See Pfaff v. HUD, 88 F.3d 739, 747 (9th Cir. 1996). For a discussion of the Pfaff opinion,
see supra note 195.
249. Id. at 747 ("Even if the appropriate standard of rebuttal in disparate impact cases normally
requires a compelling business necessity, the record in this case leads us to the conclusion that it
would be fundamentally unfair to hold the Pfaffs to this standard given HUD's truly appalling
conduct in this matter.") (footnote omitted). The Ninth Circuit's reversal (and rejection of the
"compelling" standard for business necessity) was based on several factors. As already noted, the
Ninth Circuit was sharply critical of HUD for not promulgating guidelines that would allow
landlords to determine which occupancy limits are permissible under the FHA and which are not.
See id. at 749. In addition, the Ninth Circuit noted that HUD announced the "compelling" standard
in 1993, whereas the conduct in question occurred in 1992, and the standard was "prospective in
application." Id. at 748.
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Pfaff court made reference, with no apparent disapproval, to the Betsey
case and other cases applying the "compelling" standard under other
civil rights laws.250 If the Pfaff court intended to reject the "compelling"
standard in all cases, it might have explicitly repudiated the district court
cases (Weiss and Ayres) within its jurisdiction in which the "compelling"
test was approved. For that matter, no other court has suggested that
Weiss and Ayres are anything but good law. In addition, a post-Pfaff
district court in the Ninth Circuit applied the "compelling" test without
any reference to the Pfaff decision.251
4. Plaintiff's Case
As discussed supra, the FHA is violated when an allegedly
"neutral" policy has the effect of making housing unavailable to a
member of a protected class. Courts are nearly unanimous in holding
that unfair discrimination in insurance has the effect of making housing
unavailable.
a. Race and Statistics
Housing practices that "actually or predictably result in
discrimination" are actionable under the FHA.252 The most accepted
method of showing a disparate impact on racial minorities is to
demonstrate that an underwriting rule or guideline excludes from
coverage (or provides for inferior coverage, or requires higher premiums
for) a significantly higher percentage of homes in minority
neighborhoods.
Professor Schwemm said that the "key to proving a disparate
impact claim is statistical evidence showing that the defendant's policy
or practice has a greater impact on protected class members than on
others.,23 No one disputes that, if available, statistical evidence is the
At least one other commentator agrees that Pfaff is limited to its own facts and should
have no bearing on future FHA cases considering the proper standard of business necessity required
to rebut prima facie cases of disparate impact under the FHA. See Mahoney, supra note 194, at 446.
250. See Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 747 n.3.
251. See Fair Hous. Cong. v. Weber, 993 F. Supp. 1286, 1292 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
252. See, e.g., Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934-35 (2d
Cir. 1988) (under disparate impact analysis, "a prima facie case is established by showing that the
challenged practice of the defendant 'actually or predictably results in . . .discrimination"'); Oxford
House, Inc., v. Township of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1182 (E.D.N.Y 1993) (practices that
'"actually or predictably' result[] in discrimination" violate the FHA).
253. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, § 10:6. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 938 (zoning
decision that affected 28% of area's minorities compared to 11% of whites "create[d] a strong prima
facie showing of discriminatory effect"); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th
Cir. 1984) (prima facie case established where 74.9% of the minorities were affected, while only
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most efficient way to prove a disparate impact claim. Exactly how much
statistical evidence is required to demonstrate a disparate impact is
uncertain, because "the fair housing decisions as a group [let alone fair
housing/insurance cases] have not yet produced any precise
' Even if one
mathematical formula for making this determination."254
assumes that statistical data regarding race is available, statistical data
for other protected classes such as (for example) persons with disabilities
does not exist in the insurance and housing industry.25
Recognizing the unfairness that may result from forcing plaintiffs
to produce nonexistent data, courts have held that, in disparate impact
cases, "[t]he plaintiff is not required to prove [its] case by statistics. 256
In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit explained that statistical
26.4% of the whites were affected); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 484 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that
showing of racially discriminatory effect where defendant's action "had twice the adverse impact on
minorities as it had on whites"); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1064-65 (4th Cir. 1982)
(decision which "fell 2.65 times more harshly on [the] black population than on the white
[population]" left "no doubt" of adverse impact). Cf Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430
n.6 (1971) (disparity between whites with high school diplomas (34%) and blacks with such
diplomas (12%) wag substantial and established a prima facie case of employment discrimination).
254. SCHWEMM, supra note 17, § 10:6. In the only reported decision dealing with the merits of
a disparate impact claim in the fair housing/insurance context, the court found that material issues of
experts' data precluded the insurer's motion for summary judgment. See Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 704 N.E.2d 667, 674-75 (Ohio C.P. 1997). In that case, the plaintiffs
contended that the insurer's "minimum insurance" rule excluded 82.9% of homes in AfricanAmerican neighborhoods, but only 31% of homes in white neighborhoods. See id. at 674. The
plaintiffs also contended that the insurer's "maximum dwelling age" rule excluded 92.6% of homes
in African-American neighborhoods, but only 61.3% of homes in white neighborhoods. Id. The
insurer's expert disputed these numbers, and the court denied the summary judgment motion. See id.
at 675; see also Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Farmers Ins. Group, Nos. C199-1339 & CIOO-2981, at 19
(Ohio C.P. Mar. 29, 2001) (unpublished opinion on file with author) (holding that insurer's
underwriting guidelines that allegedly prevented 93% of homeowners in African-American
neighborhoods, but only 61% of homeowners in white neighborhoods, from obtaining replacement
cost coverage stated a disparate impact claim under state fair housing laws).
255. The FHA only protects people with disabilities when there is a "nexus" between the
disability and the need for housing. See discussion infra notes 256-67 and accompanying text.
Hence, even if some data did exist regarding the relationship between housing and people with
disabilities, it would most likely be of little relevance because of its relatively small numbers. See,
e.g., Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that statistical
formulations in disparate impact cases are "less reliable" when the numbers are small).
256. Jurs v. Eaton Corp., No. K86-322, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15377, at *19 (W.D. Mich.
Oct. 14, 1987); see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (stating that statistics are
not essential in proving disparate impact); Thomas v. Wash. County Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922, 926
(4th Cir. 1990) (finding that statistics are "neither the exclusive nor a necessary means of proof" in
disparate impact cases); Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380, 387-88 (6th Cir. 1987) (rejecting
defendant's argument that "'numerical disparity' is the key in a disparate impact case" and finding
that plaintiff established disparate impact through expert testimony); Carpenter v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Wis. Sys., 728 F.2d 911,914 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Dothard, 433 U.S. at 330, when noting
that "a court may, in an appropriate case, project a disparate impact from non-statistical evidence").
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evidence is not an absolute requirement to support a disparate impact
claim:
Statistics are, however, only one factor that may assist a plaintiff in
establishing a discriminatory impact case. Robinson v. Adams, 847
F.2d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1988) (proof of disparate impact is "usually
accomplished by statistical evidence") (emphasis added), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1105, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1018, 109 S. Ct. 3155 (1989); Lowe v.
City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 1985) (summary
judgment appropriate where plaintiff had not produced "affidavits or
documentary evidence" to support her disparate impact claim),
amended, 784 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, a plaintiff is not
precluded from making a prima facie case on the basis of other
evidence. Plaintiff in this case has done so by showing she was
terminated because she failed to meet a facially neutral requirement
that could be expected to have a disparate impact on women because
of an identifiable physical difference. 257
At least one court has held that "statistics are not always necessary"
258
to establish a disparate impact in the fair housing/insurance context.
There is simply no reason to allow insurers to avoid a disparate impact
claim under the FHA merely because relevant statistical evidence does
not exist. Rather, courts will accept expert testimony in lieu of statistical
evidence in disparate impact cases.
b.

Disability and "Nexus"

Unlike the situation concerning race, there are no predominately
"handicapped" neighborhoods in the country. Accordingly, for FHA
cases involving disparate impact on those with a disability, courts have
adopted a somewhat different approach.26
In order to demonstrate that they have been discriminated against
"because of' a disability, plaintiffs in FHA cases are required to
demonstrate that a correlation (a "nexus") exists between their handicap

257. Pumphrey v. City of Couer D'Alene, No. 92-36748, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3892,
at **4-5 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 1994).
258. Toledo FairHous. Ctr., 704 N.E.2d at 673.
259. See, e.g., Pumphrey, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3892, at **3-5; Oxford House, Inc. v. Town
of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1183 & n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (relying on expert testimony to show
disparate impact).
260. Again, courts have recognized that employing traditional rules of race discrimination to
disability cases generally results in an "imperfect fit." See supra note 147.
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and a need for housing beyond the ordinary. 1.61 Otherwise, in FHA
insurance cases, the alleged discrimination is only against those who
cannot afford the charged rates (i.e., "economic discrimination"), rather
than against those with a disability."' As the Seventh Circuit put it in
Hemisphere Building Co. v. Village of Richton Park,"' only disparate
impact (and reasonable accommodation) claims under the FHA
concerning neutral rules that affected people with disabilities "by reason
of their handicap" would be actionable. Other courts have adopted
similar "nexus" or "correlation" requirements between (1) the disability,
(2) the need for housing, and (3) the challenged policy in FHA cases.265
In order for a claimant to state an FHA case against an insurer, she
must demonstrate a nexus between her disability and the type of housing
that the insurer will not cover (or to which the insurer will only provide
inferior coverage, etc.). The most obvious nexus is found in group
homes. Simply put, when people with disabilities need to live together
because of their disabilities, the requisite "nexus" between disability and
housing is established in an FHA disparate impact case.
For example, several federal courts have specifically recognized the
correlation between the handicap of recovering alcoholism/substance
addiction•266 and the need to live in a supportive, group home
environment. These courts each held that a proffered "facially neutral"
policy had an impermissible disparate impact on group homes for
261. See Robert L. Schonfeld & Seth P. Stein, Fighting Municipal Tag-Team: The Federal
Fair Housing Amendments Act and Its Use In Obtaining Access To Housing For Persons With
Disabilities, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 299, 311 (1994).
262. The FHA was never intended to guarantee housing to those who cannot afford it. See
Schwemm, supra note 167, at 247 & n.359 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 3421 (1968) (remarks of Sen.
Mondale)).
263. 171 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 1999).
264. Id. at 440 (emphasis in original). In Hemisphere Building, the Seventh Circuit considered
an FHA claim brought by a developer who wished to build houses for wheelchair-users. See id. at
238. The development ran into opposition from the village because of zoning laws regarding the
number of residences (as opposed to residents) per acre. See id. at 438-39. The Seventh Circuit
rejected the FHA claim because the zoning laws did not affect the availability of housing for people
with disabilities any more than it did for people without disabilities. See id. at 440 ("a zoning
ordinance that merely raises the cost of housing hurts everyone who would prefer to pay less and
forgo whatever benefits the higher cost confers, and so need not be waived for the handicapped").
265. See discussion infra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
266. The standard relapse rate of recovering alcoholics and substance abusers when left to their
own devices is estimated at as high as 90%. See DENNIS C. DALEY & MIRIAM S. RASKIN,
TREATING THE CHEMICALLY DEPENDENT AND THEIR FAMILIES 131-33 (1991) (providing for a
survey of studies on relapse rates among recovering addicts and alcoholics and indicating relapse
rates from 60% to 90%). Relapse frequently occurs when addicts who have completed a
detoxification program are unable to get into effective outpatient treatment or a recovery-home
setting due to overcrowding. See id. at 155.
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recovering substance abusers and alcoholics. As one court explained (in
a zoning case):
Applying § 213-1 of the Town Code to evict plaintiffs would
discriminate against them because of their handicap. Recovering
alcoholics or drug addicts require a group living arrangement in a
residential neighborhood for psychological and emotional support
during the recovery process. As a result, residents of an Oxford House
are more likely than those without handicaps to live with unrelated
individuals. Moreover, because residents of an Oxford House may
leave at any time due to relapse or any other reason, they cannot
predict the length of their stay. Therefore, a finding of a violation of
the Town Code leading to the town's eviction of plaintiffs from a
dwelling due to the size or transient nature of plaintiffs' group living
267
arrangement actually or predictably results in discrimination.

Several other courts have similarly recognized the fact that
recovering alcoholics and substance abusers have a greater need to live
in group homes than do non-handicapped persons, and have found a
disparate impact of a neutral rule against alcoholics and recovering
268
substance abuse addicts.
It cannot seriously be disputed that otherwise "neutral"
underwriting guidelines for homeowners' insurance may have a
disparate effect on group homes for recovering alcoholics and substance
users. If an insurer refuses to underwrite homeowner's insurance when
267. Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(footnote omitted).
268. See, e.g., Tsombanidis v. City of W. Haven, 180 F. Supp. 2d 262, 287 (D. Conn. 2001)
("As recovering alcoholics and drug addicts, the John Doe plaintiffs need to live in a safe,
supportive, and drug-and alcohol-free living environment during their recovery period."); Conn.
Hosp. v. City of New London, 129 F. Supp. 2d 123, 129 (D. Conn. 2001) ("As part of their
treatment, plaintiffs need to live in a safe, 'mutually-supportive,' and drug-free living environment
during the recovery period."); Samaritan Inns v. Dist. of Columbia, CA No. 93 cv 2600 RMU, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9294, at **90-92 (D.D.C. June 30, 1995) ("As former abusers of drugs and
alcohol who had advanced control over their addiction, the intended residents of Tabitha's House
were in dire need of an element critical to their productive social reintegration, affordable
housing."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 114 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Oak Ridge
Care Ctr., Inc. v. Racine County, 896 F. Supp. 867, 874 (E.D. Wis. 1995) ("Under the disparate
impact theory, if the zoning combined with the denial of conditional use permits prevents alcoholics
from living in group homes, then the policy disproportionately affects the handicapped."); Oxford
House, Inc. v. City of Albany, 819 F. Supp. 1168, 1175-76 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding the same);
Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 456 (D.N.J. 1992) (finding that
"it is crucial for recovering alcoholics and substance abusers to have a supportive, drug and alcohol
free living environment," which "substantially increases an individual's chances for recovery");
Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1344 (D.N.J. 1991) (finding
disparate impact; noting that "if the exclusionary effect of the City's actions were upheld, and were
duplicated state-wide, no Oxford Houses could exist in New Jersey").
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the dwelling in question holds more than five unrelated adult residents,
all group homes of unrelated adults either are refused insurance or are
placed into very expensive commercial categories. This rule has an
indisputable disparate impact on those in recovery from addiction, who
have a greater need to live together in such group situations.
Identifying a "nexus" might not always be easy. Consider, for
example, Gallaudet University in Washington, D.C., which is the
nation's only college for deaf students.26 9 Gallaudet, like most colleges,
recognizes numerous fraternity and sorority organizations among the
student body. If several members of a Gallaudet fraternity or sorority
decided to live together in a house, they would certainly be
"handicapped" within the meaning of the FHA-after all, they are all
deaf. The fraternity house student-residents would undoubtedly have to
pay more expensive commercial rates for insurance coverage if more
than five student-residents were living in the house.
However, the Gallaudet students would most likely not be entitled
to challenge a "no more than five boarders" rule because they would not
be living together because of their handicaps. There is nothing that
distinguishes these students from fraternity or sorority residents at other
schools other than the happenstance that they are all deaf.
Courts have refused to find a disparate impact when there is no
evidence that the residents with disabilities derive any out-of-ordinary
benefit from the housing in question. For example, in Gamble v. City of
Escondido,27 ° the Ninth Circuit considered an FHA zoning challenge
involving a "complex" facility for "elderly disabled adults. ' 71 From the
facts of the case, it appeared that there was little to distinguish the
facility from a traditional nursing home.272 There was no indication that
the residents were living in a "family situation" by sharing household
responsibilities and common living areas. Moreover, the residents
apparently possessed a wide variety of disabilities. The Ninth Circuit
made clear that, because there was no "correlation" between the
disabilities and the need for housing, no FHA claim was viable."'
at
Gallaudet
University,
available
269. See
Homepage,
http://www.gallaudet.edu/choosegallaudet.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2002)
270. 104 F.3d. 300 (9th Cir. 1997).
271. See id. at 303-04.
272. See id.
273. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit stated: "If a significant correlation exists between being
disabled and living in group homes, a disparate impact on group housing could conceivably
establish a prima facie disparate impact claim. No evidence has been presented, however, that
establishes a significant correlation between being disabled and living in group housing." Id. at 307
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It should be pointed out that a minority view rejects the "nexus"
requirement in FHA cases and appears much more lenient in allowing a
plaintiff to demonstrate a disparate impact FHA claim. In United States
v. City of Philadelphia,274 a charitable organization wanted to convert a
commercially zoned building to residential use for operation as a group
home for the mentally impaired. 27" The zoning regulation in question
required that houses in the. area have a rear yard. 76 The city argued that
application of the zoning ordinance did not violate the FHA because
there was no "causal nexus" between the ordinance's provision (the rear
yard requirement) and the prospective residents' handicaps.277 The court
rejected this argument and held that "the language of § 3604(f) does not
suggest that to establish a Fair Housing Act violation, a plaintiff must
show a 'causal nexus' between the challenged provision and the
handicaps of the prospective residents., 278 However; the prevailing view
among courts seems to require a "nexus" between the disability and a
need for housing out of the ordinary in order to distinguish "disability"
discrimination from "economic" discrimination.
5. Insurers' Defenses to Disparate Impact FHA Claims
Insurers' insistence that they apply the same underwriting rules to
everyone regardless of race/handicap is entirely irrelevant in the
disparate impact context (and in the reasonable accommodation context
for that matter). For example, in United States v. California Mobile
Home ParkManagement Co.,279 the Ninth Circuit held that imposition of
a guest parking fee on all residents could have a disproportionate effect
on residents with disabilities, who were more likely to have attendants
and other visitors than are residents without disabilities.280 The Ninth
Circuit specifically rejected the defendant's argument that imposition of
fees on everyone, on an even-handed basis, can never violate the FHA.
The court stated that, "[a]lthough defendants argue that any fee which is
generally applicable to all residents of a housing community cannot be

274. 838 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Pa. 1993); see also Hill v. Cmty. of Damien, 911 P.2d 861, 875
(N.M. 1996) (following City of Philadelphiain interpreting federal FHA).
275. See City of Philadelphia,838 F. Supp. at 225.
276. See id. at 226.
277. See id. at 229.
278. Id. The court explained that subsection 3604(f)(3) contains an independent definition of
"discrimination," one which, unlike subsections 3604(f)(1) and (2), is not modified by the phrase
"because of... handicap." See id.
279. 29 F.3d 1413 (9th Cir. 1994).
280. See id. at 1416-18 & n.4.
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discriminatory, the [FHA] itself is concerned with facially neutral rules
of all types."28'
In considering the defendant's attempts to rebut prima facie
disparate impact claims in FHA cases, courts must "view skeptically
subjective rationales concerning why [the defendant] denied housing to
members of protected groups ' 28 2 and be mindful that 'clever men may
easily conceal their motivations."'283 However, "[t]here is less reason to
be wary of subjective explanations, though, where a defendant provides
objective evidence indicating that truth lies behind his assertions of
nondiscriminatory conduct.,

28 4

Of course, if the defendant fails to

produce a reason for the discriminatory effect of its policies, courts can
assume that no justification for the discrimination exists. 211
Uncertainty exists as to whether defendants are required to
demonstrate a "compelling" business necessity, or merely a "manifest
relationship" to the business practice to justify practices that result in a
disparate impact on protected classes in FHA cases. 6 In the insurance
context, however, the debate may be largely academic, and will be of
little practical difference.
In other FHA cases, courts have accepted concerns regarding
traffic, sewer capacities, overcrowding, and safety as bona fide
justifications for business practices that result in disparate impact on
protected groups. 2 7 For insurers, however, it is difficult to imagine that
anything short of data reflecting actuarial principles would satisfy a
"business necessity" (be it "compelling" or something less) test
justifying a disparate impact against protected classes under the FHA.
As one commentator noted fifteen years ago, "[a]t the very least, the
defendant insurer should be held to a significant burden of
demonstrating some relationship between its underwriting criteria and

281. Id. at 1417. See also, e.g., Hill v. Cmty. of Damien, 911 P.2d 861, 873 (N.M. 1996)
(reversing lower court's dismissal of disparate impact claim and rejecting lower court's rationale
that no FHA violation occurred because restrictive covenant on property "was equally applicable to
all group homes, for both the handicapped and non-handicapped").
282. Soules v. HUD, 967 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1992).
283. Id. (quoting United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974)).
284. Id.
285. Cf Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143 (1977) (regarding a disparate impact
case in a Title VII action); Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380, 389 (6th Cir. 1987) (same).
286. See supra notes 243-51 and accompanying text.
287. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Advocates Ass'n v. City of Richmond Heights, 209 F.3d 626, 636
(6th Cir. 2000); Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 77 F.3d 249, 252 (8th Cir. 1996); Mountain
Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. HUD, 56 F.3d 1243, 1255-56 (10th Cir. 1995).
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'2
protection of the interests it urges as matters of business necessity. 11
Thus, anytime the insurer offers inferior coverage, has an exclusion, or
charges higher premiums as a result of an underwriting rule that results
in a disparate impact on groups protected under the FHA, the insurer
must justify such disparities with actuarial data.
Conceivably, the "business necessity" standard may make a
difference when the insurer refuses to underwrite an area or market
altogether. One can imagine that an insurer's refusal to underwrite an
area or market due to losses amounting to ten percent may be enough to
meet a "manifest relationship" business necessity standard, but not a
"compelling" standard. However, if any discriminatory basis is implied
by a refusal to underwrite an area or market, it will be race
discrimination. Because race is a constitutionally suspect class, the
"compelling" standard would most likely be the appropriate burden in
such cases.
Insurers have yet to produce an alternative standard for a defense to
charges of disparate impact other than justification by sound actuarial
data. Typically, insurers have instead proffered some variation of their
mainstay argument that disparate impact is inapplicable as a theory in
insurance cases. For example, insurers may protest that common sense
dictates that, the older a house is, the more susceptible it is to damage; or
the more unrelated people live in a house, the more likely an accident
may occur. But without supporting actuarial data or other expert
testimony, it is difficult to see how this type of argument is much
different from a blanket contention that the disparate impact theory
should not apply to FHA claims against insurers.289
As discussed supra, the insurers' contention that disparate impact is
inapplicable to insurance is a losing argument.2 90 Fair housing advocates
288. McCormack, supra note 4, at 601. The author further contends (and the author of the
instant article agrees): "The decision to insure or not to insure must be based on sound underwriting
principles. This supposedly objective analysis should support a refusal to insure if it exposes a
connection to actual or anticipated loss experience." Id. at 598-99; accord William H. Lynch &
Gregory Squires, Time to Deal With, Not Fight, Fair Housing Act, NAT'L UNDERWRITER: PROP. &
CAS./RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION, Mar. 18, 1996, at 23 ("[I]f an insurer can show a policy or
practice would result in unacceptable losses and is associated with risk, and no other practice will
equally serve that legitimate business objective, there is no [FHA disparate impact] violation.");
Badain, supra note 4, at 15 ("[T]hese practices may be justified to the extent that they are supported
by sound actuarial data-this is the distinction between fair and unfair discrimination.") (emphasis
in original).
289. Cf Tsombanidis v. City of W. Haven, 180 F. Supp. 2d 262, 291 (D. Conn. 2001)
(rejecting city's "nondiscriminatory explanation" that it was attempting to enforce the zoning code
to prevent operation of Oxford House in single-family neighborhood; court had already ruled that
zoning code was not exempt from FHA mandates).
290. See discussion supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
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have long charged that insurers expend so much effort attempting to
avoid application of the FHA to the industry because they are guarding
empty cupboards. Indeed, the industry's adamant insistence that the
FHA is not applicable to insurance can be explained partly (if not
primarily) by the fact that-despite assurances that insurers "measure
risk as accurately as [they] can"-the industry generally does not
possess the data that statistically justifies disparities in housing
underwriting."' So long as insurers are in the homeowners' underwriting
lines, they must underwrite homes fairly, within the meaning of the FHA.
Moreover, as discussed supra, the argument that insurers are
handcuffed by state insurance regulations from ever deviating from
underwriting guidelines is unpersuasive. In holding that the McCarranFerguson Act does not bar FHA claims,293 the federal courts have made
clear that state regulations and FHA compliance are independent of each
other. In addition, the insurer must still demonstrate that no alternatives
exist to lessen the discriminatory effects that its policies may have on
protected classes. Insurers can and often do make exceptions and
deviations to their underwriting rules and guidelines, including by
making necessary filings with the state regarding "rules. 294 National
insurance organizations such as the Insurance Services Office, Inc.
("ISO"),"'5 can assist insurers in amending any discriminatory policies.
Of course, to demonstrate that no less discriminatory alternatives to the
underwriting policies in question exist, insurers should be required to
demonstrate that a state would refuse to approve the changes to
underwriting guidelines that the plaintiffs propose.296

291. See Squires, supra note 14, at 47.
292. See discussion supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
294. Cf Tsombanidis, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 297-98 (deciding a zoning/FHA case and stating "the
Court is not persuaded by the Fire District's excuse that it did not have the power to modify the Fire
Safety Code"); see also PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 689 (2001) (rejecting PGA's
argument that it could not consider granting an exception to its rules because the rules did not
provide for exceptions); Wis. Corr. Serv. v. City of Milwaukee, 173 F. Supp. 2d 842, 853 (E.D.
Wis. 2001) (city cannot exempt itself from compliance with disability anti-discrimination laws).
295. ISO is a national insurance industry service organization that develops and files coverage
forms, promulgates advisory loss costs, and performs other services for and on behalf of its member
companies. It is the leading supplier of statistical, actuarial, and underwriting information for and
about the property/casualty insurance industry. For more information about ISO, see generally at
http://www.iso.com (2002).
296. See, e.g., Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1269 n. II (Ilth Cir. 2000)
(rejecting insurers' laments that any changes to policies would require state approval because "there
is nothing to indicate that approval would be withheld").
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C. Reasonable Accommodations
The final theory of liability under the FHA is failure to make a
reasonable accommodation. Obviously, this theory is only applicable if
the homeowner or resident has a disability. No court has yet considered
an FHA/reasonable accommodation claim on the merits in the insurance
context, although the Wai.9' and Koontz298 courts have denied defendant
insurers' motions to dismiss in such circumstances.299
Although no court has so ruled directly in an FHA case, insurers
should be expected to make modifications to their underwriting criteria
and to adjust the premiums charged as an accommodation for a person
covered by the FHA. There is no question that the FHA is to be afforded
a generous construction, and that there exists no special exemption for
insurance companies under the FHA.3 °° In addition, courts have rejected
arguments that FHA accommodations are limited to "trivial"
modifications (such as relaxation of a "no pets" rule), 0 ' and have also
noted that reasonable accommodations
under the FHA 'can and often
3'0 2
will involve some costs. '
1. Plaintiffs Case
Granting a "reasonable accommodation" has been defined as
"changing some rule that is generally applicable to everyone so as to
make its burden less onerous on the handicapped individual." 3 Courts
are currently split as to whether the plaintiff or the defendant has the
burden of demonstrating that an accommodation under the FHA is
reasonable. The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits place the burden on the
plaintiff.3' 4 In contrast, the Third Circuit places the burden on the
defendant.05
297. 75 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999).
298. No. C2-98-318 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 21, 2002) (unpublished decision on file with author).
299. See Wai, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 5-8; Koontz, No. C2-98-318, at 2-4.
300. See supra notes 30-35, 65-66 & 177-78 and accompanying text.
301. See Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 1995).
302. Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096, 1104 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Shapiro,
51 F.3d at 335); see also United States v. Cali. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1417
(9th Cir. 1994) (reasonable accommodation mandate "contemplates some financial burden resulting
from accommodation").
303. Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799:F. Supp. 450, 462 n.25 (D.N.J.
1992); see also Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of Olathe, 38 F. Supp. 2d 914, 924 (D. Kan. 1999);
N. Shore-Chicago Rehab. Inc. v. Vill. of Skokie, 827 F. Supp. 497,499 (N.D. I11.1993).
304. See Groner v. Golden Gate Gardens Apts., 250 F.3d 1039, 1045 (6th Cir. 2001); Bryant
Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, 124 F.3d 597, 603-04 (4th Cir. 1997); Elderhaven, Inc. v. City
of Lubbock, 98 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1996).
305. See Hovsons, 89 F.3d at 1103.
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The author believes that the sensible solution would be to adopt the
burden of proof applicable under the Americans with Disabilities Act as
set forth in the First Circuit's decision in Reed v. Lepage Bakeries, Inc.3°6
The Reed court determined that the plaintiff bore the burden making a
preliminary showing that his proposed accommodation was necessary
and reasonable.0 7 The defendant, in turn, bore the burden of establishing
that the proposed accommodation would result in an undue burden.0 8
The Reed court specifically relied in part on statutory language of
the ADA that explicitly places the burden of demonstrating an undue
hardship on the defendant.3"9 Although the FHA does not contain such
language, the concept of "reasonable accommodation" seems the same
under both statutes.30 The burden of proof should likewise be similar.
Common sense dictates that plaintiffs are best situated to know what
type of accommodation they need to enjoy equal opportunity in housing,
and that defendants are best situated to know whether the proposed
accommodation would result in an undue burden on their business
practices. Furthermore, it would be inconsistent to require the insurer in
FHA cases to bear the burden of justifying a disparate impact, but
require the plaintiff to bear the same burden for reasonable
accommodation, where the inquiry is essentially the same.
An FHA plaintiff "must show that, absent the requested reasonable
accommodation, handicapped persons will be unable to live in the
particular dwelling of their choice in a particular neighborhood of their
choice." '' As is the case with disparate impact, courts have generally
required plaintiffs to demonstrate a nexus between the disability and the
need for housing out of the ordinary. Merely having a disability does not
entitle a homeowner or resident to an accommodation from an insurer or
any other defendant in an FHA case. If there is no such "nexus," then the
306. 244 F.3d 254 (1st Cir. 2001).
307. See id. at 259.
308. See id. at 258-59.
309. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
310. Cf.Tsombanidis v. City of W. Haven, 180 F. Supp. 2d 262, 283 (D. Conn. 2001) (noting
that legal analyses under FHA and ADA "are essentially the same").
311. ReMed Recovery Care Ctrs. v. Township of Willistown, 36 F. Supp. 2d 676, 685 (E.D.
Pa. 1999); see also Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 795 (6th Cir. 1996);
Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096, 1105 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that the FHAA was
intended to prohibit regulations that deny handicapped individuals the right "to live in the residence
of their choice in the community") (emphasis omitted); City of Edmonds v. Wash. St. Bldg. Code
Council, 18 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Congress intended the FHAA to protect the right of
handicapped persons to live in the residence of their choice in the community."), aff'd., 514 U.S.
725 (1995); Oxford House, Inc., v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1185-86 n.10 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (stating that "a handicapped individual must be allowed to enjoy a particular dwelling, not
just some dwelling somewhere in the town") (emphasis omitted).
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person with a disability is not seeking a reasonable accommodation, but
is instead trying to obtain special treatment that puts him in a better
position than that of nondisabled members of the public.
For example, as discussed supra, Gallaudet fraternity brothers
would not be entitled to any "reasonable accommodation" in insurance
premiums for their fraternity house, because they are not living together
because of their handicaps.31 In contrast, it has been widely
acknowledged and accepted that residents of Oxford Houses (i.e.,
recovering alcoholics and substance abusers) do live together because of
their handicaps. 3 3 Such evidence conclusively demonstrates that an
accommodation to alleviate the burden 1of
living together caused by their
4
FHA.
the
under
necessary
is
handicaps
Again, the distinction between residents living together because of
their handicap (Oxford House) and residents living together who all
happen to have a disability (Gallaudet fraternities) may not always be
clear. In Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments,"5 individuals
with unspecified disabilities who qualified for "Section 8 housing
assistance from the federal government" brought an FHA lawsuit against
a landlord who refused to accept "Section 8" tenants. 316 A divided
Second Circuit panel rejected the FHA claim, reasoning that refusing to
accept "Section 8" tenants amounted to "economic discrimination"
rather than disability discrimination under the FHA. 3 7 Although the
Second Circuit acknowledged that there may be a "need of people with
certain handicaps to live together in order to share support personnel and
to reinforce each other's efforts in creating and maintaining a home,"3 8
the court was not persuaded by expert testimony that people with

312. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
314. See, e.g., Groome Res., Ltd., v. Parish of Jefferson, 52 F. Supp. 2d 721, 724 (E.D. La.
1999) (accommodation necessary when "trial evidence convinces the Court that the artificial limit
of four unrelated persons living in a single group home will make it economically unfeasible for
plaintiff to operate the [group] home"); ReMed Recovery Care Ctrs., 36 F. Supp. 2d at 686
(evidence that group home could not be operated with only five residents demonstrated that
accommodation was necessary).
315. 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998).
316. Id. at 295.
317. See id. at 302; accord Williams v. 5300 Columbia Pike Corp., Nos. 95-2964, 3091, 1996
U.S. App. LEXIS 31004, at **10-11 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 1996) (finding that a plan to convert
cooperative association into condominium regime did not have the effect of making housing
"unavailable" to people with disabilities).
318. Salute, 136 F.3d at 302.
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disabilities were three times as likely to be eligible for Section 8 status
as were people without disabilities. 3 9
The Salute majority's decision can perhaps be read as holding that
only specific types of disabilities may support the requisite "nexus"
between disability and housing, as opposed to disabilities in general. 20 It
will be of paramount importance for plaintiffs to demonstrate that the
requested accommodation is necessary for the person with a disability to
enjoy an equal opportunity in housing.
2. Insurers' Defenses
Once the plaintiff has demonstrated that he is entitled to a
reasonable accommodation against an insurer in an FHA case, very few
defenses exist for an insurer. Insurers will get nowhere contending that
risk pools must be strictly defined and adhered to in order to ensure
uniformity and fairness in rates and underwriting. That is simply another
way of saying that3 2insurance should be exempted from the FHA's
mandates altogether. '
The entire point of a "reasonable accommodation claim is that a
[FHA] defendant must make an affirmative change in an otherwise valid
'
law or policy."322
Therefore, any arguments that the insurer is not
discriminating because it has treated the plaintiff with a disability the
"same" as any other policyholder would be ineffective against a claim
alleging failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. As the Wai
court explained:
If a dwelling is made unavailable to a person with a disability, that
person is denied an "equal opportunity to use and enjoy" the dwelling.
If a reasonable accommodation in "rules, policies, practices, or
services" is necessary to avoid that situation, refusal to provide that

319. See id. at 312 n.24 (Calebresi, J.,dissenting). For additional discussion as to whether
discrimination against "Section 8" recipients should be actionable under the FHA, see generally
Kim Johnson-Spratt, Note, Housing Discrimination and Source of Income: A Tenant's Losing
Battle, 32 IND. L. REV. 457 (1999).
320. See Salute, 138 F.3d at 301-02.
321. In any event, plaintiffs can easily respond to such an argument by noting that "'strict
adherence to a rule which has the effect of precluding handicapped individuals from residing in the
residence [of their choice] was precisely the type of conduct which the Fair Housing Amendments
Act sought to overcome."' Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096, 1106 (3d Cir. 1996)
(quoting United States v. Vill. of Marshall, 787 F. Supp. 872, 879 (W.D. Wis. 1991)).
322. Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1501-02 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Parish of
Jefferson v. Allied Health Care, Inc., CA Nos. 91-1199, 1200, 3959, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9124,
at *19 (E.D. La. June 10, 1992).
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accommodation
is discrimination under the clear language of the
323
FHA.

It is also no response for an insurer to contend that its underwriting
rules are exempt from the reasonable accommodation mandates simply
because a particular underwriting guideline has been in place for decades
(as they often are). The legislative history of the FHAA anticipated this
type of argument and rejected it:
A discriminatory rule, policy, practice or service is not defensible
simply because that is the manner in which such rule or practice has
traditionally been constituted. This section would require that changes
be made to such traditional rules or practices if necessary to permit a
person with handicaps an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
dwelling.324

Indeed, once the plaintiff demonstrates that he qualifies for a
reasonable accommodation from an insurer, the only remaining question
would be whether or not the change in premium constitutes a
"reasonable accommodation" within the meaning of the FHA. Generally,
"[a]n accommodation is reasonable when it imposes no 'fundamental
alteration in the nature of a program' or 'undue financial and
administrative burdens."'325

323. Wai v. Allstate Ins. Co., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1999). Numerous judicial decisions
have applied § 3604(f)(3)(B)'s "reasonable accommodation" mandates to FHA defendants'
otherwise facially neutral policies. See, e.g., United States v. Cali. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co.,
107 F.3d 1374, 1381 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing cases pertaining to exceptions to zoning ordinances
that would allow disabled people to live in residential neighborhoods); Elderhaven, Inc. v. City of
Lubbock, 98 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1996) (regarding an elderly care facility requiring special
exception from single-family zoning ordinance); Jankowski Lee & Assocs. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d
891, 894-95 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that a parking space was needed to accommodate sufferer of
multiple sclerosis); Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 429 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that even though a
prohibition of pets in apartments is common, facially neutral, and indeed reasonable, the FHA
requires a relaxation of it to accommodate a hearing dog for a deaf person); Green v. Hous. Auth. of
Clackamas County, 944 F. Supp. 1253, 1256 (D. Or. 1998) (same); Horizon House Developmental
Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683, 699-700 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aff'd
mem., 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993); Viii. of Marshall, 787 F. Supp. at 876-79; Oxford HouseEvergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1344-45 (D.N.J. 1991); United States v.
Commononwealth of Puerto Rico, 764 F. Supp. 220, 224 (D.P.R. 1991); Boulder Meadows v.
Saville, 2 P.3d 131, 138 (Col. Ct. App. 2000) (requiring landlord to waive otherwise generally
applicable maintenance fee for handicapped tenant under FHA and state fair housing law).
324. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 25 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2186. See,
e.g., Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 333 (2nd Cir. 1995); Viii. of Marshall, 787 F.
Supp. at 879 ("[Sltrict adherence to a rule which has the effect of precluding handicapped
individuals from residing in the residence was precisely the type of conduct which the [FHAA]
sought to overcome with the enactment of § 3604(f)(3)(B).").
325. Groner v. Golden Gate Gardens Apts., 250 F.3d 1039, 1044 (6th Cir. 2001).
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"Undue burden" or "undue hardship" is not defined in the FHAA.
However, courts would most likely find guidance from the ADA, which
defines "undue hardship" as "requiring significant difficulty or
expense," taking into consideration several listed factors such as the cost
of the accommodation, the financial resources of the business, and the
characteristics of the operations.326
Finally, in order to assess the reasonableness of an accommodation,
the cost to the defendant and benefit to disabled community should be
considered and weighed together.327 Courts have repeatedly recognized
the "very strong public policy" favoring the right of handicapped
individuals to live in congregate living arrangements in traditional
residential community settings."'
Under these standards, insurers are left with no real argument to
avoid application of the "reasonable accommodation" provision to their
underwriting criteria if the plaintiff can meet his own burdens. In the
first place, insurers often make exceptions and deviations for a variety of
reasons, and a request for a reasonable accommodation is no different
from these situations. There is a process in place for doing so, including
by making necessary filings with the state regarding "rules." ISO assists
in such amended filings, and could assist in amending this very rule
about roomers or boarders.329
In addition, application of the reasonable accommodation
provisions of section 3601(f)(3)(B) is unlikely to have any impact on an
insurer's balance sheet. Insurers have been known to set forth
apocalyptic prophesies that offering insurance to all applicants with
disabilities regardless of whether they meet the purportedly neutral
eligibility requirements would be catastrophic. Even ignoring the fact
that insurers generally have no statistical data to support these types of
arguments, insurers must remember that very few of such potential
326. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1994). One court interpreting the ADA has defined "undue
hardship" as a "concept approaching financial ruin." Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F.
Supp. 763, 781 (E.D. Tex. 1996). Although this standard seems high, it is not inconsistent with the
statutory definition. No circuit court has rejected the Anderson standard.
327. See Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 795 (6th Cir. 1996);
United States v. City of Chicago Heights, 161 F. Supp. 2d 819, 836-37 (N.D. Il. 2001).
328. See, e.g., Hill v. Cmty. of Damien, 911 P.2d 861, 874 (N.M. 1996); Rhodes v. Palmetto
Pathway Homes, Inc., 400 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1991) (it is "the public policy of the United States
... to encourage and support handicapped persons' right to live in a group home in the community
of their choice"). One federal court noted that it would be "hard-pressed to deny the significance of
the public interest in supporting efforts like Oxford House to assist in and encourage the recovery of
alcoholics and drug addicts." Oxford House, Inc., v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450,
465 (D.N.J. 1992).
329. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
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applicants could meet the criteria of section 3601(f)(3)(B) as interpreted
by the courts. Again, the hypothetical Gallaudet fraternity house or the
nursing facility in Gamble would not qualify for a reasonable
accommodation under section 3601(f)(3)(B), and should therefore not be
considered in the insurer's estimates of the potential costs of complying
with the FHA. Any suggestions from insurers that adjusting their
underwriting criteria would be too costly should be scrutinized carefully
to ensure that they are only considering potential applicants that, in fact,
meet FHA criteria.
Moreover, it would be disingenuous for an insurer to contend that a
reasonable accommodation to an underwriting guideline would
constitute a "fundamental alteration" of that guideline. Most of the time,
the applicant will be seeking the exact same line of insurance, with only
an alleviation of the particular rule that is precluding the applicant from
obtaining the insurance without the accommodation. Without any
evidence in the guise of actuarial data that alleviating the rule would
pose increased risks in a section 3601(f)(3)(B) situation,33 ° insurers'
claims of "fundamental alteration" ring completely hollow.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Insurers have historically been reluctant to acknowledge that the
FHA is applicable to insurance practices. Rather than work with HUD
and/or fair housing advocates to reach agreeable standards governing the
FHA's application to underwriting, insurers have instead preferred to
litigate FHA claims, asserting numerous arguments denying that the
FHA covers insurance.
The insurers' strategy has been unsuccessful, and any continued
efforts to evade the FHA's province altogether will most likely result in
unnecessary waste. With the exception of Mackey-which has never
been followed and most likely never will be-courts have unanimously
held that the FHA is applicable to insurance. Although no case has
proceeded to trial and judgment, recent decisions have clarified exactly
what is needed to prove an FHA claim challenging unfair discrimination
by an insurer.
330. Sometimes it can be argued that the house in question actually poses lower risks for
underwriting purposes. In Oxford Houses, for example, the residents are expected to abide by strict
rules of conduct or face expulsion from the residence. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to
imagine exactly how an Oxford House with ten residents poses a greater risk than another house
with five unrelated adults. Cf Tsombanidis v. City of W. Haven, 180 F. Supp. 2d 262, 291 (D.
Conn. 2001) (finding no evidence in a zoning case that Oxford House "would effect a fundamental
change in the nature of the neighborhood").
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Insurers would be well-advised to either re-examine many of their
long-standing practices that could potentially be vulnerable to FHA
claims, or else be prepared to produce statistical data justifying any
disparities in coverage that affect protected classes. Fair housing
advocates should be encouraged by successes in FHA/insurance suits,
and most likely will continue to utilize the FHA as a means of
combating unfair discrimination in insurance.
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